Your Right to Make Bad Decisions Under New Jersey Law

Your Right to Make Bad Decisions Under New Jersey Law

A 2020 New Jersey Supreme Court decision, S.T. v. 1515 Broad Street, LLC, 241 N.J. 257 (2020), raises a question that matters far beyond the personal injury lawsuit at its center: how much evidence does it take before a court can take away an adult's right to control her own affairs? The answer, the Court held, is a great deal — and the procedures required to get there are not optional.

The case is also a reminder of something that even lawyers sometimes forget - - you have the right to make what may seem like an objectively bad decision. A choice that looks unwise to a lawyer or a judge is not, by itself, evidence of incapacity.

What Happened to S.T.

S.T. was a forty-four-year-old chemical engineer, a Vietnamese refugee who had served in the U.S. Army and earned advanced degrees in engineering and environmental science. In 2008, she was struck on the head by a metal plate that fell from a doorway as she exited her office building in Bloomfield. The injury was serious. The Social Security Administration declared her permanently disabled within a year. Over the following years, she was diagnosed with post-concussion syndrome, major depressive disorder, cognitive impairment, and related conditions — all found to be permanent and causally related to the accident. She made more than 500 visits to healthcare providers.

She filed a personal injury lawsuit against the building owner and others. During the litigation, the defendants made an offer of judgment for $475,000. S.T. rejected it, against the advice of her attorney, who believed the offer was in her best interest given the challenges in proving her case.

Rather than accept her decision, S.T.'s own attorney filed a motion to have a guardian ad litem appointed to determine whether she had the mental capacity to make litigation decisions. He did not copy S.T. on the motion. The court appointed one without giving S.T. notice or a hearing. The guardian ad litem investigated, concluded S.T. lacked the capacity to decide whether to settle or go to trial, and was then granted the authority by the court to make that decision for her. A $625,000 settlement was reached — without S.T.'s consent. She appeared at the final hearing and objected forcefully, comparing the forced settlement to a life sentence. The court approved it anyway.

The Appellate Division affirmed. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed.

Guardian Ad Litem vs. Legal Guardian: A Critical Distinction

The trial court's core mistake was treating the role of a legal guardian and guardian ad litem as interchangeable. They are not, and the difference is legally significant.

A legal guardian is appointed only after a court has formally adjudicated that a person is incapacitated — meaning impaired by mental illness or intellectual disability to the extent that the person "lacks sufficient capacity to govern himself and manage his affairs." N.J.S.A. 3B:1-2. That process requires a formal complaint, sworn affidavits from qualified medical professionals, at least twenty days' notice to the person, the right to independent counsel, and a hearing at which incapacity must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Only then may a court appoint a guardian with the legal authority to make decisions on someone else's behalf. For more on how that process works, see Understanding Guardianship in New Jersey and What Happens After You're Appointed Guardian.

A guardian ad litem serves a fundamentally different and more limited function. When a person is alleged — not adjudicated — to be mentally incapacitated, a court may appoint a guardian ad litem to investigate the question and report back. The guardian ad litem acts, as the Court put it, as "the eyes of the court" — an independent investigator, not a decision-maker. The guardian ad litem's recommendations are not binding on the court, and the court cannot delegate its own fact-finding function to the guardian ad litem. The guardian ad litem's job is to advise the court whether a formal guardianship hearing under Rule 4:86 should proceed — not to replace the person's judgment in the meantime.

In S.T.'s case, the court skipped the adjudication entirely. It appointed a guardian ad litem, then immediately handed that person the authority to settle S.T.'s lawsuit over her objection — without ever holding the guardianship hearing that New Jersey law requires. The Supreme Court described this as the trial court "abdicating the Judiciary's nondelegable oversight and factfinding function" and "outsourcing to the guardian ad litem the role of final arbiter of S.T.'s capacity."

The Right to Make a Poor Decision

One of the most important principles running through the Supreme Court's opinion is the one the lower courts failed to apply: making a decision that others consider unwise is not, by itself, determinative of incapacity.

New Jersey law recognizes a clear public policy favoring the right of self-determination for all people. Competent people, the Court noted, "ordinarily can choose what they want, even when their choices are unwise or contrary to their best interests." The Rules of Professional Conduct require lawyers to abide by their client's decisions about the scope and objectives of representation — including the decision whether to settle a lawsuit. RPC 1.2(a). A lawsuit is a property right protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that right cannot be taken away without following the procedural safeguards the law demands.

The trial court judge told S.T. at the settlement hearing that she was "a very intelligent woman" but that "sometimes a little knowledge is dangerous" and that the mere fact that she wanted to reject a $625,000 offer was "troubling." The Supreme Court saw that reasoning for what it was: substituting the court's and counsel's judgment for the client's, without the legal authority to do so. As the Court observed, had S.T. not rejected the original $475,000 offer — the very rejection her attorney cited as evidence of her diminished capacity — an additional $150,000 would never have been placed on the table.

This same tension between protection and autonomy runs through all of New Jersey's guardianship law. Even in a formal guardianship proceeding, the Court has held that a family member cannot be bypassed without a plenary hearing and proper due process — and that the incapacitated person's own prior expressed wishes must be considered. See New Jersey Appellate Court Clarifies Judge’s Role in Guardianship Cases.

When Diminished Capacity Does Not Mean Incapacity

The Court did not rule that S.T. was definitely competent, or that her attorney was wrong to have concerns. It ruled that those concerns, however sincere, had to be tested through a proper legal process before they could justify overriding S.T.'s decisions. Diminished capacity — the standard her attorney described — is not the same as legal incapacity under New Jersey law. A person can process information slowly, struggle with complex tasks, or even make choices others consider irrational, and still retain the legal right to govern her own affairs.

The distinction matters in a range of contexts beyond personal injury litigation. A person without a formal guardian has the right to make their own financial decisions, their own medical decisions, and their own legal decisions — even ones that others in their life consider harmful. Until a court makes a formal finding of incapacity through the process New Jersey law requires, that person's autonomy is legally protected.

The lesson of S.T. is straightforward. Good intentions — whether those of an attorney, a family member, or a court — do not substitute for due process. The procedures New Jersey law requires before a person can be deprived of the right to manage her own affairs exist for a reason. They are not bureaucratic formalities. They are the line between protection and the loss of liberty.

NJ Medicaid Fair Hearing Process Changes in Effect July 1, 2026

The New Jersey Department of Human Services, Division of Medical Assistance and Health Services issued Medicaid Communication No. 26-06 on June 23, 2026. The communication announces significant operational changes to the NJ FamilyCare Medicaid fair hearing process, effective July 1, 2026. These changes end a series of temporary procedural flexibilities that DMAHS put in place during the COVID-19 public health emergency unwinding period, which concluded December 31, 2025. Beneficiaries, advocates, and practitioners who handle Medicaid appeals should review these changes carefully.

The three key changes are:

  • End of automatic continuation of benefits pending appeal. During the unwinding period, benefits were automatically reinstated and continued for all members who filed a fair hearing request after a termination or reduction. That automatic reinstatement ends July 1, 2026. Going forward, members must affirmatively elect to continue benefits while their appeal is pending. If a member does not make that election, benefits will be paused. Members who elect continuation of benefits and ultimately lose their appeal may have the cost of services recouped by DMAHS under N.J.A.C. § 10:49-10.4(b) — but DMAHS has stated it will not seek recoupment for services delivered beyond the 90-day regulatory deadline for final administrative action, except in cases involving fraud or abuse of the hearing process.
  • Return to the 20-day fair hearing filing deadline. During the unwinding period, DMAHS temporarily extended the filing period to 60 days. That extension ends July 1, 2026, and the standard 20-day deadline under N.J.A.C. § 10:49-10.3(b) resumes. However, DMAHS is building in 10 days of mailing presumption time — five days for standard mail processing and five days to account for the USPS postmark rule change effective December 24, 2025 — meaning fair hearing notices will state that members have 30 days from the date on the notice to file. The request must be made within that 30-day window, with proof of mailing or faxing.
  • Resumption of DMAHS review of OAL Initial Decisions. Under standard procedure, OAL Administrative Law Judges conduct hearings and issue Initial Decisions, which DMAHS then reviews before issuing a Final Agency Decision. During the unwinding period, certain Initial Decisions in income, resource, and failure-to-provide-information cases were automatically adopted as Final Agency Decisions without DMAHS review. That shortcut ends July 1, 2026. DMAHS will now review Initial Decisions in all cases, though it expects to use a streamlined process for most routine cases, issuing a brief Final Agency Decision adopting the Initial Decision. Deeper review is reserved for cases involving material error, novel legal issues, or timely filed exceptions raising unusual circumstances.

The most consequential change for beneficiaries is the end of automatic aid continuation. Under the prior temporary process, filing a fair hearing request was sufficient to keep benefits running while the appeal was pending. That is no longer the case. Starting July 1, members who receive a termination or reduction notice must take an affirmative step to elect continuation of benefits — and the fair hearing notice itself will need to clearly communicate that option. Advocates should prepare clients to act on this immediately upon receipt of any adverse notice, and should ensure they understand the recoupment risk if the appeal is unsuccessful within the 90-day window.

The full communication, including a fact sheet with computation examples, is available here.

When Does New Jersey Medicaid Pay My Medicare Part B Premium?

When Does New Jersey Medicaid Pay My Medicare Part B Premium?

Many people turning age 65 are surprised to learn about the costs associated with Medicare. Medicare is not free. Most people pay no premium for Medicare Part A, which covers hospital services, but Medicare Part B — which covers doctor visits, outpatient care, and medical equipment — carries a monthly premium. In 2026, the standard Part B premium is $202.90 per month. For people with higher incomes, the premium is higher. If you have both Medicare and Medicaid, however, you may not have to pay that premium at all.

Full Dual Eligibles: SSI, ABD, and MLTSS Medicaid

If you receive full Medicaid coverage — meaning Medicaid pays for your medical services, not just your Medicare premiums — Medicaid will pay your Medicare Part B premium through a process called Medicare “buy-in.” This applies to people receiving SSI-linked Medicaid, ABD Medicaid (Aged, Blind, and Disabled), and NJ MLTSS Medicaid (Managed Long Term Services and Supports), which covers assisted living and nursing facility services.

For SSI recipients, the Medicare buy-in is effective as of the Medicaid enrollment date. For all other full Medicaid recipients, including MLTSS enrollees, the buy-in takes effect two months after enrollment. During that gap, you may still be paying the Part B premium out of pocket. Once the buy-in is processed, Medicaid reimburses you for any out of pocket premiums paid after the two month waiting period, while the buy-in was pending.

Partial Coverage: Medicare Savings Programs

If you do not qualify for full Medicaid but have limited income and resources, you may still be able to get help with your Part B premium through a Medicare Savings Program (MSP). New Jersey offers several levels of coverage:

  • Qualified Medicare Beneficiary (QMB): Covers the Part B premium, Part A and B deductibles, and coinsurance for people with income at or below 100% of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL).
  • Specified Low-Income Medicare Beneficiary (SLMB): Covers the Part B premium only, for people with income between 100% and 120% of FPL.
  • Qualifying Individual (QI / SLMB Q1): Covers part of the Part B premium for people with income between 120% and 135% of FPL.

You can apply for MSP benefits by completing the NJ Save application.

NJ Medicaid 2026 Community Spouse Maintenance Adjustments

The New Jersey Department of Human Services, Division of Medical Assistance and Health Services issued Medicaid Communication No. 26-05 on June 11, 2026. The communication announces annual adjustments to the Community Spouse Maintenance Allowance (CSRA), shelter threshold, and related figures under N.J.A.C. 10:71-5.7, effective July 1, 2026. These figures govern how much of an institutionalized spouse's income may be set aside to support the spouse remaining in the community.

Key updated figures effective July 1, 2026:

  • Community spouse base maintenance allowance: Increased from $2,643.75 to $2,705.00 per month.
  • Excess shelter cost threshold: Increased from $793.13 to $811.50 per month. Shelter costs above this amount are added to the base allowance.
  • Standard utility allowance: Remains $878.00 per month (effective October 1, 2025), applicable where the community spouse directly pays utility charges.
  • Community spouse resource allowance: Unchanged. The greater of $32,532 or one-half of the couple's countable resources, not to exceed $162,660.
  • Home equity maximum: Unchanged at $1,130,000.

The Community Spouse Maintenance Allowance is calculated by starting with the $2,705.00 base, adding any shelter costs exceeding $811.50 (including the $878.00 utility allowance if directly paid), and then subtracting the community spouse's own gross income. The result is the amount that may be deducted from the institutionalized spouse's income before applying it to the cost of care.

The full communication, including a fact sheet with computation examples, is available here.

Chiropractic: A Science-Based Legal Perspective

Chiropractic: A Science-Based Legal Perspective

Chiropractic is one of the most widely used — and most litigated — forms of alternative medicine in the United States. In New Jersey alone, there are roughly 2,000 licensed chiropractors, and the industry has fought aggressively in courtrooms and legislatures to expand its legal status, secure insurance reimbursement, and position itself on equal footing with medical doctors. In a previous post, I examined the legal status of homeopathy in New Jersey. Chiropractic raises many of the same questions — and some that are uniquely its own.

This post examines what the science actually says about chiropractic, why it remains legal and insurance-covered despite persistent scientific controversy, and how New Jersey courts and regulators have shaped the profession’s reach over the years.

Origins of Chiropractic

Chiropractic was founded in 1895 by Daniel David Palmer, a magnetic healer from Iowa who claimed he received the practice’s core principles from the spirit of a deceased physician. Palmer’s central theory was that nearly all disease originates from “vertebral subluxations” — misalignments of the spinal vertebrae that he believed interfered with the body’s “innate intelligence” flowing through the nervous system. Adjust the spine, the theory went, and you restore the body’s natural healing power.

The problem is that the chiropractic subluxation, as defined by Palmer and his followers, has never been demonstrated to exist. It is distinct from the orthopedic concept of a subluxation — which refers to a partial dislocation of a joint that is visible, measurable, and clinically meaningful. The chiropractic subluxation is a metaphysical concept rooted in vitalism, not anatomy. No peer-reviewed study has ever established that spinal “nerve interference” from a subluxated vertebra causes organic disease.

This foundational problem has never been resolved. The chiropractic profession remains deeply divided between “straight” chiropractors who still adhere to Palmer’s subluxation theory and “reform” or evidence-based chiropractors who limit their practice to neuromusculoskeletal conditions like back pain and neck pain.

What the Evidence Actually Shows

To be fair to the evidence-based faction of the chiropractic profession, there is legitimate support for spinal manipulation as a treatment for specific musculoskeletal complaints. Some studies have found spinal manipulation to be a reasonable option with modest benefit for low back pain in some patients. That is a significant but narrow finding. It does not validate chiropractic as a system of medicine. It does not support the claim that spinal manipulation treats asthma, ear infections, colic, high blood pressure, or any of the other conditions that many chiropractors continue to market for treatment. Systematic reviews have consistently found no reliable evidence that chiropractic care is effective for conditions other than certain types of back and neck pain — and even there, the benefit is modest and comparable to physical therapy.

More concerning is the safety profile. High-velocity neck manipulation — the kind involving a rapid twisting motion of the cervical spine — carries a known risk of vertebral artery dissection, a tear in the artery wall that can cause stroke. The risk is low in absolute terms but not negligible, and the potential modest benefit does not outweigh the significant risk of injury.

Chiropractic Versus the American Medical Association

The same question I asked about homeopathy applies here: if the foundational science is so contested, why is chiropractic not only legal but actively reimbursed by health insurance and Medicare?

The answer is largely historical and political. Chiropractic has been licensed in all 50 states since the 1970s, the result of sustained lobbying over nearly a century. In 1972, Congress amended the Social Security Act to include chiropractic services under Medicare — but only for spinal manipulation for back conditions, a limitation that chiropractors have fought to expand ever since. The American Medical Association declared chiropractic an “unscientific cult” in 1966 and advised its members that associating with chiropractors was unethical. That posture backfired legally when, in 1987, a federal court found in Wilk v. American Medical Association that the AMA had engaged in an unlawful conspiracy to restrain trade — essentially, an illegal boycott of a competitor. The AMA’s aggressive opposition to chiropractic, whatever its scientific merit, had crossed the line into an antitrust violation as far as the court was concerned. The Wilk case is a stark reminder that scientific fact and consensus versus the search for truth in a courtroom are vastly different concepts. In other words, the legal merit of the Wilk case did not depend on whether chiropractic was a scientifically sound medical discipline. Rather the case turned on varying factors that have nothing to do with the scientific method, including US antitrust law, the ability of the lawyers involved, the biases and ability of the few judges involved, the burden of proof in a civil case (often described as “more likely than not”), the law and court rules governing expert testimony (which has created “experts” that only exist in courtrooms), the rules of evidence, and the truthfulness and likeability of the witnesses.    

To summarize, the Wilk decision did not validate chiropractic science. It simply established that the AMA could not use coordinated institutional pressure to drive chiropractors out of business. The practical effect, however, was to legitimize chiropractic further in the eyes of insurers, regulators, and the public.

New Jersey: The Fight for Insurance Reimbursement

New Jersey has been a significant battleground for chiropractic insurance reimbursement. The state’s largest health insurer, Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of New Jersey, became the target of a class action lawsuit brought on behalf of thousands of NJ chiropractors.

The case, DeMaria et al. v. Horizon Healthcare Services, Inc., centered on Horizon’s practice of “bundling” chiropractic claims. When a chiropractor provided chiropractic manipulative therapy (CMT) together with evaluation and management services (E/M) or physical therapy (PT) during the same visit, Horizon automatically denied payment for the E/M and PT, folding everything into a single global fee for the CMT — regardless of what services were actually rendered.

In 2009, following a regulatory complaint by the Association of New Jersey Chiropractors (ANJC), the New Jersey Department of Banking and Insurance (DOBI) declared Horizon’s bundling practice a violation of New Jersey’s Unfair Claim Settlement Practices Act, and issued a cease and desist order effective 2010. The class action lawsuit, filed in 2011, sought damages for the period before the DOBI order — from December 2005 through April 2010.

In June 2015, a federal court certified two classes of chiropractors — an ERISA class and a non-ERISA class — covering over 9,500 practitioners whose claims had been systematically denied. In 2016, Horizon agreed to a $33 million settlement, one of the largest ERISA benefit class action settlements involving healthcare providers in the country at that time.

DeMaria was not an isolated case. New Jersey chiropractors also obtained a significant settlement against CIGNA Insurance and American Specialty Health Network (ASHN) over out-of-network reimbursement practices. That matter resulted in an $11.75 million settlement, with a former president of the Association of New Jersey Chiropractors serving as the lead out-of-network plaintiff.

The DeMaria case established an important precedent: an insurer’s systematic denial of provider claims based on an undisclosed internal bundling policy can be challenged as a class action under both ERISA and New Jersey contract law. As with the Wilk case, it is important to keep in mind that DeMaria the CIGNA cases had nothing to do with the scientific merit of chiropractic.

Are Chiropractors Equal to Medical Doctors Under New Jersey Law?

Chiropractors have long sought to be treated as equivalent to physicians under the law — particularly in the context of expert witness testimony, scope of practice, and professional titles. New Jersey law draws a clear but sometimes contested line.

Under N.J.S.A. 45:9-14.5, the practice of chiropractic in New Jersey is defined as a philosophy, science, and healing art focused on the reduction of chiropractic subluxation and the examination, adjustment, and treatment of the articulations and soft tissue of the body. Chiropractors in New Jersey may use the title “doctor” but it must be qualified with the words “doctor of chiropractic,” “chiropractor,” or “chiropractic physician,” or the abbreviation D.C. Critically, chiropractors cannot prescribe medications, perform surgery, or conduct endoscopy. When a patient’s condition falls outside the scope of chiropractic, the chiropractor is required to refer the patient to a licensed physician.

Chiropractors as Expert Witnesses: The Permanency Certification Problem

The question of whether a chiropractor qualifies as a “physician” under New Jersey law is not merely academic. It has significant practical consequences in personal injury litigation — particularly in automobile accident cases governed by the Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act (AICRA), N.J.S.A. 39:6A-8.

Under AICRA’s verbal threshold provision, a plaintiff who has selected the limitation on lawsuit option cannot sue for pain and suffering unless they can demonstrate, among other things, that they have sustained a permanent injury. To survive a defense motion for summary judgment on that issue, the plaintiff must provide a certification from a “licensed, treating physician” asserting that a permanent injury was sustained. The question of whether a chiropractor qualifies as a “physician” for that purpose produced a sustained split in the New Jersey courts.

Early opinions struggled with the definitional ambiguity. In Pensabene v. Straus, 342 N.J. Super. 196 (Law Div. 2001), the court noted that the definitional portion of the verbal threshold statute is confusing and relied on how other courts had construed “physician” in other statutory contexts — concluding that it would be unjust to deprive an injured plaintiff of their claim simply because they chose to treat with a chiropractor rather than a medical doctor. Olarte v. Crocker, 380 N.J. Super. 203 (Law Div. 2002), reached the same conclusion by reasoning that since chiropractors were not specifically excluded from the statutory definition, the legislature must have intended to include them.

Those conclusions were challenged in subsequent unpublished opinions by a trial judge who took a more textually rigorous approach. In Afram v. Heller, the trial judge reasoned that chiropractors are not permitted to diagnose or treat the systems and conditions that physicians are trained and licensed to address, and that they lack the authority to administer the objective diagnostic tests — such as MRI interpretation — that the AICRA statute requires before a permanency opinion can be rendered. A chiropractor, on that view, cannot produce the foundational clinical work that a permanency certification is supposed to represent.

The Appellate Division resolved the split by siding with the more permissive line of cases, holding in Afram v. Heller that a chiropractor’s permanency certification is sufficient to survive a summary judgment motion under AICRA. That holding, combined with the Supreme Court’s decisions in Serrano and DiProspero — which reduced the plaintiff’s burden on the subjective impact element of the verbal threshold — significantly shifted the balance in favor of plaintiffs in automobile injury litigation.

The Accutane Problem: Why the Science Should Matter in Court

The Afram holding sits in uncomfortable tension with a more fundamental question that the court never confronted: what is the scientific basis for treating a chiropractor’s opinion on permanent injury as reliable expert testimony in the first place?

In the case In re Accutane Litigation, 234 N.J. 340 (2018), the New Jersey Supreme Court adopted Daubert-based reliability principles for expert testimony in civil cases. Under that standard, a trial court acts as a gatekeeper whose responsibility is to assess whether an expert’s opinion is grounded in “sound, adequately-founded scientific methodology involving data and information of the type reasonably relied on by experts in the scientific field.” Mere credentials are not enough. The methodology itself must be reliable. Where it is not, the expert opinion is inadmissible.

That standard creates a serious problem for chiropractic expert testimony that courts have largely chosen to ignore. Consider what the scientific record actually establishes. The foundational theory of chiropractic — that vertebral subluxations interfere with the body’s innate intelligence and cause disease — has no support in peer-reviewed science. The best available evidence for the practice’s most defensible application, spinal manipulation for back and neck pain, shows efficacy roughly comparable to physical therapy. That is not a fringe critique of chiropractic; it is the mainstream scientific consensus.

Now apply the Accutane standard to that baseline. If a physical therapist were to take the stand in a personal injury case and offer an opinion that a car accident caused a plaintiff’s permanent spinal injury, that testimony would not survive a gatekeeping motion. Physical therapists are not licensed to diagnose, cannot interpret imaging studies, and are not trained in the clinical evaluation of permanent impairment. No plaintiff’s attorney would seriously propose calling a physical therapist for that purpose, and no court would permit it. The evidentiary logic is straightforward: the witness’s training and methodology do not support the opinion being offered.

If chiropractic’s evidence base is genuinely comparable to physical therapy for the conditions at issue — and the scientific literature says it is — then there is no principled reason to reach a different conclusion for a chiropractor’s permanency opinion. A chiropractor in New Jersey cannot interpret MRI films, cannot prescribe medications, and cannot perform the diagnostic workup that a meaningful permanency evaluation requires. The opinion rests on a clinical foundation that is, at best, no more rigorous than what a physical therapist could offer.

The Afram court did not engage with this problem because it was resolving a question of statutory interpretation, not evidentiary reliability. The question before it was whether the AICRA statute’s use of the word “physician” included chiropractors — and the court answered that question yes, largely on the grounds that excluding chiropractors would be unjust to plaintiffs who chose to treat with one. That is a pragmatic policy judgment, not a scientific one. And it has the effect of bypassing the gatekeeping function that Accutane subsequently demanded.

The result is a structural inconsistency in New Jersey civil litigation. In a toxic tort or product liability case, plaintiffs’ experts must demonstrate that their methodology meets a rigorous reliability standard or face exclusion. In an automobile personal injury case, a chiropractor’s certification of permanent injury — resting on a professional framework whose foundational theory has no scientific validity — is treated as legally sufficient to defeat summary judgment. The same New Jersey court system that demands sound scientific methodology in one context has, in another, institutionalized a workaround that insulates chiropractic opinions from that scrutiny entirely.

That inconsistency has real consequences. Defense attorneys in automobile injury cases would be well-served by exploring whether Accutane’s reliability principles can be used to challenge the admissibility of chiropractic expert testimony at the trial level, even where Afram controls the certification question at summary judgment. The two analyses are not the same: Afram addresses whether a chiropractor’s certification is sufficient under AICRA as a matter of statutory interpretation; Accutane addresses whether the underlying expert opinion is scientifically reliable enough to be placed before a jury.

The Ongoing Push to Expand Scope of Practice

The chiropractic industry in New Jersey has pursued legislative expansion of its scope of practice over the years. A significant legislative effort, led over a five-year period by the ANJC’s legislative chairman, resulted in an expanded Chiropractic Practice Act signed into law by Governor Jon Corzine — the first expansion of the scope of chiropractic practice in New Jersey in 57 years. The same effort produced the first Licensed Chiropractic Assistant legislation in the United States, later signed into law by Governor Chris Christie.

These expansions are significant because they reflect the chiropractic profession’s sustained political strategy: use the legislature and the courts to steadily widen the boundaries of what chiropractors are permitted to do, regardless of whether the underlying science supports those expanded claims.

Final Thoughts

Chiropractic occupies an unusual position in American healthcare: a profession with a pseudoscientific foundation that has nonetheless secured legal standing, insurance coverage, and political influence through a century of determined advocacy. Some of what chiropractors do — spinal manipulation for back pain — has legitimate, if modest, evidence behind it. Much of what the profession claims beyond that does not.

New Jersey’s legal landscape reflects this tension at every level. Courts and regulators have pushed back against insurance abuse while simultaneously expanding the profession’s legal footprint through legislation. And in the personal injury context, the courts have allowed a statutory interpretation decision — Afram — to effectively shield chiropractic expert opinions from the scientific reliability scrutiny that In re Accutane demands of every other category of expert testimony in civil litigation. A profession whose best-supported application is comparable in efficacy to physical therapy has been granted, through a combination of statutory ambiguity and judicial pragmatism, an expert witness status that the science does not justify.

Consumers are best served by approaching chiropractic with the same critical eye they would apply to any healthcare decision: ask what the evidence says, understand the limits of the treatment, and consult a licensed physician for any condition that may require diagnosis or medical management.