New Jersey Supreme Court Rejects Shaken Baby Syndrome Testimony as Unreliable Science

New Jersey Supreme Court Rejects Shaken Baby Syndrome Testimony as Unreliable Science

On November 20, 2025, the New Jersey Supreme Court issued one of the most significant evidentiary rulings in the state’s criminal law in years. In State v. Nieves, the Court held that expert testimony diagnosing Shaken Baby Syndrome/Abusive Head Trauma (SBS/AHT) — specifically, the theory that shaking an infant without any impact to the head can cause a recognized cluster of injuries — is not reliable enough to be presented to a jury. The decision affirmed rulings by two trial courts and the Appellate Division, and it represents a rare and important judicial reckoning with what has long been treated as settled medical fact in the courtroom.

This post explains what the Court decided, why it matters, and what it says about the broader problem of unreliable science being presented as certainty in the courtroom.

The Two Cases

The decision consolidated two prosecutions involving similar facts. In the first, Darryl Nieves was the primary caregiver of an infant, D.J., who had a complicated medical history including premature birth and cardiac surgery. At eleven months old, D.J. experienced three episodes of seizure-like symptoms over two weeks, each occurring while Nieves was caring for him. D.J. was found to have bilateral retinal hemorrhages and bilateral subdural bleeding. A child abuse pediatrician reviewed his history, found no other explanation, and diagnosed SBS/AHT “within a reasonable degree of medical certainty.” Nieves was indicted on aggravated assault and child endangerment charges. A second defendant, Michael Cifelli, faced a similar diagnosis from the same physician under similar circumstances.

Both men challenged the admissibility of the State’s SBS/AHT testimony before trial, arguing the underlying science was not reliable enough to meet New Jersey’s evidentiary standard.

How New Jersey Tests Reliability

Under New Jersey Rule of Evidence 702, expert testimony is admissible only if the field of inquiry is developed enough that an expert’s opinion can be considered reliable. New Jersey applied the “Frye standard” for these cases, which asks whether the underlying science has gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific field — and courts can identify more than one relevant field, with general acceptance required in each. This matters enormously here: the SBS/AHT diagnosis is delivered by pediatricians, but its scientific foundation traces back to biomechanics, the engineering discipline that studies how physical forces affect the human body — the same field behind crash-test research used in vehicle safety design.

Tracing SBS/AHT Back to Its Scientific Roots

The Court’s opinion traces the diagnosis back to its scientific roots, and that history matters. In 1968, a neurosurgeon studying whiplash injuries from car accidents concluded that brain injury could result from rotational forces on the head and neck alone, without direct impact — research that had nothing to do with infants or shaking. Other researchers later relied on that study to hypothesize that a shaken infant could suffer similar injuries, and through a series of papers in the early 1970s, the theory of infant “whiplash-shaking” began to spread through the medical community.

In 1987, the first biomechanical study actually designed to test the shaking hypothesis using infant models was published — and it concluded that shaking alone does not produce the injuries associated with SBS/AHT. In 2002, the original whiplash researcher published a paper criticizing the way his own work had been used to support the theory. A decade later, the neurosurgeon who first proposed the shaking hypothesis questioned it as well. In other words, the diagnosis used for decades to support convictions was built on biomechanical assumptions that the biomechanical community itself never fully validated, and that some of the theory’s own originators eventually disavowed.

Why the State Lost

At the Frye hearing in Nieves, the State called a single expert, a child abuse pediatrician, who testified that shaking alone could produce the recognized triad of symptoms. The defense countered with biomechanical engineers who testified that no scientific testing has ever established that a human being can generate the physical force necessary to cause those injuries through shaking alone. The trial court found this decisive, noting that the few studies attempting to establish a force threshold relied on monkeys, wooden dolls, or other mechanical stand-ins for an infant’s body — models that cannot reliably substitute for human anatomy. No study has ever measured what shaking a real infant actually produces in force, because no such study could ethically be performed.

The Supreme Court agreed, and its reasoning turned on a critical concession by the State itself. In supplemental briefing, the State acknowledged that disagreement exists among biomechanical engineers generally regarding whether shaking alone can cause abusive head trauma. The Court treated that admission as significant evidence, on its own, that the biomechanical community has not reached general acceptance on the question — and emphasized that biomechanics is not peripheral, but the very field from which the SBS/AHT theory originated. The Court acknowledged general acceptance within much of the medical and pediatric community, but held that was not enough. The State did not meet its burden because biomechanics is also a relevant scientific community and general acceptance was lacking there.

What the Decision Does Not Do

The ruling is narrower than it may sound. The Court did not hold that abuse involving head trauma is unprovable, and did not bar physical evidence of abuse from reaching a jury. Where there is independent evidence — bruising, fractures, an admission, or any other physical indicator of impact or injury — the State remains free to present it. What the Court excluded is expert testimony asserting, as a matter of medical certainty, that the symptoms alone prove the child was shaken without any impact, when the underlying biomechanical science does not support that conclusion. The Court also left the door open for the future: New Jersey adopted a Daubert-based reliability standard for some expert testimony in 2023, and the Court noted that if new, reliable scientific evidence develops, the State could attempt to establish SBS/AHT’s reliability under that standard in a later case. This is not a permanent ban — it is a determination that, on this record, the science was not there yet.

The decision was also not unanimous. One justice dissented, arguing that SBS/AHT is endorsed by every major medical association involved in its diagnosis and treatment, that every other state to consider the question has allowed the testimony, and that the majority let a handful of biomechanical engineers override the broader medical consensus. The majority’s response was that the State’s own concession of disagreement among biomechanical engineers, combined with that field’s direct relevance to the theory’s scientific foundation, was enough on its own to defeat a claim of general acceptance — regardless of how many medical organizations had endorsed the diagnosis.

Why This Case Matters Beyond These Two Defendants

SBS/AHT prosecutions are not rare. For decades, a diagnosis delivered with confidence by a pediatric specialist has been sufficient, in courtrooms across the country, to support a conviction — even when the medical diagnosis itself was the only evidence of abuse. New Jersey’s highest court has now said, in a published and precedential decision, that this practice rests on a scientific foundation that has not been adequately tested, and that the field most directly responsible for that foundation has not reached consensus on its core premise.

This is what happens when a court takes seriously its role as a gatekeeper against unreliable expert evidence. Science adapted specifically to answer a legal question — rather than developed independently and later applied to one — deserves exactly this kind of scrutiny. The history traced in this opinion shows a theory that migrated from automobile whiplash research into infant medicine, gained momentum through repetition and institutional endorsement, and was never tested against the basic question of whether shaking an infant can actually generate the force the theory requires. That is not how reliable science works, and it is not how evidence that can take away someone’s liberty should reach a jury.

For families and defendants facing an SBS/AHT allegation in New Jersey, this decision is significant. It does not mean such a charge can never be proven — independent physical evidence of abuse remains fully admissible. But the diagnosis alone, offered as medical certainty that shaking without impact occurred, can no longer reach a New Jersey jury without first surviving the scrutiny this opinion demands.

Ex-Spouse’s Right to Payable on Death Bonds Not Altered by Divorce Agreement

Ex-Spouse’s Right to Payable on Death Bonds Not Altered by Divorce Agreement

On January 27, 2025, in In the Matter of the Estate of Michael D. Jones, Deceased (A-28-23) (088877) the Supreme Court of New Jersey addressed whether an ex-spouse’s right as the pay-on-death (POD) beneficiary of U.S. savings bonds was modified by the couple’s divorce agreement. The case, which involved the interplay between federal bond regulations and New Jersey’s estate and family law, ultimately affirmed that the ex-wife retained her right to the bonds despite the divorce.

Case Background

The husband purchased Series EE U.S. savings bonds during his marriage to his ex-spouse, designating her as the POD beneficiary. The couple later divorced and executed a divorce settlement agreement, which provided for certain asset distributions but did not explicitly mention the savings bonds. The settlement agreement also required him to pay $200,000 in installments. At the time of his death, the ex-wife had received approximately $110,000 of this sum. After his passing, she redeemed the savings bonds, which were valued at approximately $77,800. The estate, administered by his daughter from a prior relationship, argued that the bond redemption should count toward the outstanding settlement agreement payments, effectively satisfying his financial obligation. The trial court agreed, but the Appellate Division reversed the decision, holding that federal regulations governing savings bonds preempted state law, thereby affirming the ex-spouse’s entitlement to the bonds. The NJ Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, though it disagreed regarding the issue of preemption.

Key Legal Issues

  1. Federal Preemption and State Law

    • The Appellate Division held that N.J.S.A. 3B:3-14, which revokes certain property transfers upon divorce, was preempted by federal law regulating savings bonds.
    • However, the New Jersey Supreme Court disagreed, stating that preemption was not at issue because the state statute explicitly defers to governing instruments, which in this case were the federal regulations governing savings bonds.

  2. Effect of the Divorce Settlement Agreement

    • The court found that the settlement agreement was silent on the savings bonds and did not revoke the ex-spouse’s beneficiary status.
    • A catchall provision in the settlement agreement stating that “any marital asset not listed belongs to the party who has it in their possession” was interpreted as reinforcing the ex-spouse’s claim to the bonds, because they were the husband’s before his death and immediately passed to the ex-spouse upon death.

  3. Right of Survivorship Under Federal Law

    • Federal regulations establish that upon the death of a bondholder, the designated POD beneficiary becomes the sole owner.
    • The court ruled that the trial court’s assumption that Michael intended to revoke Jeanine’s status was speculative and contrary to federal protections of survivorship rights.

Court’s Decision

The Supreme Court of New Jersey ultimately ruled that:

  • Jeanine rightfully retained ownership of the savings bonds as the designated POD beneficiary under federal regulations.
  • The bonds were separate from the $200,000 owed to Jeanine under the settlement agreement, meaning she was still entitled to the remaining balance of the settlement.
  • The trial court’s ruling impaired the ex-spouse’s federal survivorship rights, a result not permitted under the governing regulations.

Implications and Takeaways

This case serves as an important reminder for estate and family law practitioners, particularly concerning the treatment of federal savings bonds in divorce settlements. Key takeaways include:

  • Explicit Clarity in Divorce Agreements: Individuals going through a divorce should ensure that all assets, including savings bonds, are explicitly addressed in settlement agreements to avoid future litigation.
  • Deference to Federal Regulations: State courts must recognize and uphold federal regulations governing financial instruments like U.S. savings bonds.
  • Automatic Revocation Limitations: N.J.S.A. 3B:3-14 does not automatically revoke all beneficiary designations upon divorce when federal law dictates otherwise.
  • Importance of an Estate Plan: The case highlights the importance of seeking estate planning guidance and understanding beneficiary designations, as well as probate versus non-probate assets.

By affirming the ex-spouse’s rights to the bonds, the court reinforced the importance of adhering to federal estate regulations while also ensuring fair application of state divorce laws. This ruling will likely guide future disputes involving federal financial instruments and marital property division.

Tax Sale Law Violates Fifth Amendment Takings Clause Says NJ Supreme Court

Tax Sale Law Violates Fifth Amendment Takings Clause Says NJ Supreme Court

On January 9, 2025, the New Jersey Supreme Court issued a decision addressing whether the state’s old Tax Sale Law (before it was amended in 2024) violated the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause by allowing the forfeiture of surplus equity from tax foreclosures without just compensation. In an opinion by Chief Justice Stuart Rabner, in 257-261 20th Avenue Realty, LLC v. Alessandro Roberto (A-29-23) (088959) the Court found the prior version of the Tax Sale Law to be unconstitutional. Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2023 ruling in Tyler v. Hennepin County, the Court held that property owners in New Jersey have a recognized right to surplus equity—the value of a property beyond the amount owed in taxes. The ruling clarified that private lienholders, acting jointly with municipalities to enforce tax foreclosures, are considered state actors subject to the requirements of the Takings Clause of the US Constitution.

Background of the Case

The case arose from a Paterson, NJ property owner’s failure to pay three sewer tax bills totaling just $606.00. The City of Paterson placed tax liens on the property, which were purchased by 257-261 20th Avenue Realty, LLC at a public auction. Years later, the company filed for foreclosure, and the property owner failed to respond, resulting in a judgment of foreclosure.

The property owner subsequently sought to vacate the judgment, arguing that the property —valued at over $500,000.00 — held significant equity vital for his retirement. He had invested $200,000.00 in improvements and had set aside $50,000.00 to pay the judgment. Despite these circumstances, the foreclosure judgment transferred the entire property, including its substantial surplus equity, to the lienholder without compensating the property owner for the value exceeding the tax debt.

The trial court vacated the judgment under NJ Court Rule 4:50-1(f), finding exceptional circumstances, and the Appellate Division affirmed, citing the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Tyler v. Hennepin County (2023), which held that forfeiture of surplus equity in tax foreclosures violates the Takings Clause.

Key Issues Addressed by the NJ Supreme Court

  1. Takings Clause and Surplus Equity: The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the government from taking private property for public use without just compensation. The NJ Supreme Court, relying on Tyler, held that surplus equity—the value of the property exceeding the tax debt—is a protected property right. The pre-2024 Tax Sale L allowed the complete forfeiture of surplus equity to lienholders, a practice deemed unconstitutional.
  2. Lienholders as State Actors: The Court rejected the argument that private lienholders are not state actors and thus not subject to the Takings Clause. Tax foreclosure involves a public function—collecting taxes—and relies on a statutory framework created by the state. The Court determined that the collaboration between municipalities and lienholders renders the latter state actors for constitutional purposes.
  3. Public vs. Private Use: The Court dismissed the contention that the taking of surplus equity was not for public use. The Tax Sale serves a public purpose by enabling municipalities to collect taxes. However, the US Constitution requires that property taken for public use must be accompanied by just compensation, which the pre-2024 TSL failed to provide.

Significance of the Tyler Precedent

The NJ Supreme Court’s decision heavily relied on the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2023 ruling in Tyler v. Hennepin County. In Tyler, the Court held that a Minnesota tax foreclosure law allowing the forfeiture of surplus equity was unconstitutional. Similarly, the NJ Supreme Court found that property owners in New Jersey have a recognized right to surplus equity under both state and federal law. As Tyler is binding precedent, the NJ Supreme Court clarified that it did not need to rely on Rule 4:50-1(f)to vacate the foreclosure judgment but instead resolved the case on constitutional grounds.

Impact on Tax Foreclosure in New Jersey

This ruling has profound implications for New Jersey’s tax foreclosure system. Property owners now have a constitutionally recognized right to retain surplus equity in foreclosure proceedings. Municipalities and lienholders cannot confiscate more value than is necessary to satisfy the tax debt. This is a clear shift toward greater accountability and fairness in tax foreclosure practices. It is a major win for the average New Jersey property owner.

N.J. Supreme Court Says Adult Protective Services Not Responsible for Attorney Fees for Appointed Guardianship Counsel: In the Matter of A.D.

N.J. Supreme Court Says Adult Protective Services Not Responsible for Attorney Fees for Appointed Guardianship Counsel: In the Matter of A.D.

On December 11, 2024, the New Jersey Supreme Court issued its opinion for In the Matter of A.D., (A-30/31-23) (088942) addressing whether court-appointed attorneys and temporary guardians are entitled to fee awards from Adult Protective Services (APS) when an incapacitated person’s estate lacks sufficient funds. The Court held that fee awards are not available.

Case Overview

The case originated in June 2020, when the Sussex County Division of Social Services, Office of Adult Protective Services (APS), sought a plenary guardianship for “Hank,” an alleged incapacitated person. The court appointed Steven J. Kossup, Esq. to represent Hank and Brian C. Lundquist, Esq. as temporary guardian. Both attorneys took significant steps to stabilize Hank’s life, ensuring he had stable housing, financial aid, and medical care. Despite APS’s recommendation for a permanent plenary guardian, Kossup and Lundquist advocated for a limited guardianship. Their position was supported by an expert psychologist, retained at Lundquist’s expense, who opined that Hank required only a limited guardianship. The trial court ultimately agreed. Kossup and Lundquist then applied for compensation for their services, seeking to have their fees paid by APS, as Hank’s estate lacked sufficient funds. While APS did not contest the amount of the fees, it argued that paying such fees would compromise its ability to serve its clients. The trial court and the Appellate Division denied the fee applications, prompting an appeal to the New Jersey Supreme Court.

Supreme Court’s Analysis

In a unanimous opinion, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the fee applications. The decision emphasized the following key points:

1. The American Rule and Limited Exceptions

New Jersey adheres to the “American Rule,” which requires litigants to bear their own legal costs unless explicitly authorized by statute or court rule. New Jersey Court Rule 4:42-9(a) provides eight exceptions to the rule, two of which were invoked in this case:

  • Statutory Authorization: The Court found that neither the Adult Protective Services Act (APS Act) nor the statutes governing guardianships authorize fee awards against APS. Both statutes limit fee awards to the estate of the incapacitated person.
  • Guardianship Rules: Rule 4:42-9(a)(3) and Rule 4:86-4(e) permit fees to be paid from the incapacitated person’s estate or “in such other manner as the court shall direct.” However, the Court clarified that this language does not authorize fee awards against APS.

2. Rejection of the DiNoia Precedent

The Court explicitly declined to adopt the holding in In re Guardianship of DiNoia (2019), where the Appellate Division upheld a fee award against APS. The court in DiNoia ordered APS to pay counsel fees because APS had “protracted the litigation” by failing to provide information in a timely manner, and court-appointed attorney made exceptional efforts on behalf of his client. The Supreme Court held that such reasoning does not align with the American Rule or the governing statutes and rules, and ruled that there is no basis to authorize fee awards against APS under any circumstances, even if it protracted litigation.

3. Pro Bono Service

The Court highlighted the longstanding tradition of pro bono service in guardianship matters, particularly when the incapacitated person’s estate lacks resources. It acknowledged the substantial burden this places on attorneys and urged trial courts to consider the equitable distribution of these assignments.

Practical Guidance for Future Cases

The Court offered several recommendations for handling guardianship matters:

  • Clear Communication: Judges should inform attorneys and guardians at the outset if their service is expected to be pro bono.
  • Court Oversight: Judges, not Surrogates, are responsible for appointing counsel, determining the need for temporary guardians, and addressing compensation.
  • Expert Fees: Temporary guardians serving pro bono should consult the court before retaining experts, ensuring funds are available to cover fees.

Broader Implications

The ruling in In the Matter of A.D. establishes that APS providers cannot be held financially responsible for court-appointed attorney fees, even if APS causes delay and the need for the attorney to perform extraordinary work on the case. While this reinforces the American Rule, it raises questions about the sustainability of pro bono service in guardianship cases, especially given the increasing demand for such legal representation. The Court expressed gratitude for the exemplary work of Kossup and Lundquist but acknowledged the need for systemic changes to address the burdens of pro bono service. This may include increased funding for legal aid programs or other measures to ensure fair allocation of responsibilities. As the population continues to age and demand for guardianship services grow, the legal community and policymakers must work together to ensure equitable and sustainable solutions.