NJ Medicaid 2026 Community Spouse Maintenance Adjustments

The New Jersey Department of Human Services, Division of Medical Assistance and Health Services issued Medicaid Communication No. 26-05 on June 11, 2026. The communication announces annual adjustments to the Community Spouse Maintenance Allowance (CSRA), shelter threshold, and related figures under N.J.A.C. 10:71-5.7, effective July 1, 2026. These figures govern how much of an institutionalized spouse's income may be set aside to support the spouse remaining in the community.

Key updated figures effective July 1, 2026:

  • Community spouse base maintenance allowance: Increased from $2,643.75 to $2,705.00 per month.
  • Excess shelter cost threshold: Increased from $793.13 to $811.50 per month. Shelter costs above this amount are added to the base allowance.
  • Standard utility allowance: Remains $878.00 per month (effective October 1, 2025), applicable where the community spouse directly pays utility charges.
  • Community spouse resource allowance: Unchanged. The greater of $32,532 or one-half of the couple's countable resources, not to exceed $162,660.
  • Home equity maximum: Unchanged at $1,130,000.

The Community Spouse Maintenance Allowance is calculated by starting with the $2,705.00 base, adding any shelter costs exceeding $811.50 (including the $878.00 utility allowance if directly paid), and then subtracting the community spouse's own gross income. The result is the amount that may be deducted from the institutionalized spouse's income before applying it to the cost of care.

The full communication, including a fact sheet with computation examples, is available here.

New Jersey Supreme Court Rejects Shaken Baby Syndrome Testimony as Unreliable Science

New Jersey Supreme Court Rejects Shaken Baby Syndrome Testimony as Unreliable Science

On November 20, 2025, the New Jersey Supreme Court issued one of the most significant evidentiary rulings in the state’s criminal law in years. In State v. Nieves, the Court held that expert testimony diagnosing Shaken Baby Syndrome/Abusive Head Trauma (SBS/AHT) — specifically, the theory that shaking an infant without any impact to the head can cause a recognized cluster of injuries — is not reliable enough to be presented to a jury. The decision affirmed rulings by two trial courts and the Appellate Division, and it represents a rare and important judicial reckoning with what has long been treated as settled medical fact in the courtroom.

This post explains what the Court decided, why it matters, and what it says about the broader problem of unreliable science being presented as certainty in the courtroom.

The Two Cases

The decision consolidated two prosecutions involving similar facts. In the first, Darryl Nieves was the primary caregiver of an infant, D.J., who had a complicated medical history including premature birth and cardiac surgery. At eleven months old, D.J. experienced three episodes of seizure-like symptoms over two weeks, each occurring while Nieves was caring for him. D.J. was found to have bilateral retinal hemorrhages and bilateral subdural bleeding. A child abuse pediatrician reviewed his history, found no other explanation, and diagnosed SBS/AHT “within a reasonable degree of medical certainty.” Nieves was indicted on aggravated assault and child endangerment charges. A second defendant, Michael Cifelli, faced a similar diagnosis from the same physician under similar circumstances.

Both men challenged the admissibility of the State’s SBS/AHT testimony before trial, arguing the underlying science was not reliable enough to meet New Jersey’s evidentiary standard.

How New Jersey Tests Reliability

Under New Jersey Rule of Evidence 702, expert testimony is admissible only if the field of inquiry is developed enough that an expert’s opinion can be considered reliable. New Jersey applied the “Frye standard” for these cases, which asks whether the underlying science has gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific field — and courts can identify more than one relevant field, with general acceptance required in each. This matters enormously here: the SBS/AHT diagnosis is delivered by pediatricians, but its scientific foundation traces back to biomechanics, the engineering discipline that studies how physical forces affect the human body — the same field behind crash-test research used in vehicle safety design.

Tracing SBS/AHT Back to Its Scientific Roots

The Court’s opinion traces the diagnosis back to its scientific roots, and that history matters. In 1968, a neurosurgeon studying whiplash injuries from car accidents concluded that brain injury could result from rotational forces on the head and neck alone, without direct impact — research that had nothing to do with infants or shaking. Other researchers later relied on that study to hypothesize that a shaken infant could suffer similar injuries, and through a series of papers in the early 1970s, the theory of infant “whiplash-shaking” began to spread through the medical community.

In 1987, the first biomechanical study actually designed to test the shaking hypothesis using infant models was published — and it concluded that shaking alone does not produce the injuries associated with SBS/AHT. In 2002, the original whiplash researcher published a paper criticizing the way his own work had been used to support the theory. A decade later, the neurosurgeon who first proposed the shaking hypothesis questioned it as well. In other words, the diagnosis used for decades to support convictions was built on biomechanical assumptions that the biomechanical community itself never fully validated, and that some of the theory’s own originators eventually disavowed.

Why the State Lost

At the Frye hearing in Nieves, the State called a single expert, a child abuse pediatrician, who testified that shaking alone could produce the recognized triad of symptoms. The defense countered with biomechanical engineers who testified that no scientific testing has ever established that a human being can generate the physical force necessary to cause those injuries through shaking alone. The trial court found this decisive, noting that the few studies attempting to establish a force threshold relied on monkeys, wooden dolls, or other mechanical stand-ins for an infant’s body — models that cannot reliably substitute for human anatomy. No study has ever measured what shaking a real infant actually produces in force, because no such study could ethically be performed.

The Supreme Court agreed, and its reasoning turned on a critical concession by the State itself. In supplemental briefing, the State acknowledged that disagreement exists among biomechanical engineers generally regarding whether shaking alone can cause abusive head trauma. The Court treated that admission as significant evidence, on its own, that the biomechanical community has not reached general acceptance on the question — and emphasized that biomechanics is not peripheral, but the very field from which the SBS/AHT theory originated. The Court acknowledged general acceptance within much of the medical and pediatric community, but held that was not enough. The State did not meet its burden because biomechanics is also a relevant scientific community and general acceptance was lacking there.

What the Decision Does Not Do

The ruling is narrower than it may sound. The Court did not hold that abuse involving head trauma is unprovable, and did not bar physical evidence of abuse from reaching a jury. Where there is independent evidence — bruising, fractures, an admission, or any other physical indicator of impact or injury — the State remains free to present it. What the Court excluded is expert testimony asserting, as a matter of medical certainty, that the symptoms alone prove the child was shaken without any impact, when the underlying biomechanical science does not support that conclusion. The Court also left the door open for the future: New Jersey adopted a Daubert-based reliability standard for some expert testimony in 2023, and the Court noted that if new, reliable scientific evidence develops, the State could attempt to establish SBS/AHT’s reliability under that standard in a later case. This is not a permanent ban — it is a determination that, on this record, the science was not there yet.

The decision was also not unanimous. One justice dissented, arguing that SBS/AHT is endorsed by every major medical association involved in its diagnosis and treatment, that every other state to consider the question has allowed the testimony, and that the majority let a handful of biomechanical engineers override the broader medical consensus. The majority’s response was that the State’s own concession of disagreement among biomechanical engineers, combined with that field’s direct relevance to the theory’s scientific foundation, was enough on its own to defeat a claim of general acceptance — regardless of how many medical organizations had endorsed the diagnosis.

Why This Case Matters Beyond These Two Defendants

SBS/AHT prosecutions are not rare. For decades, a diagnosis delivered with confidence by a pediatric specialist has been sufficient, in courtrooms across the country, to support a conviction — even when the medical diagnosis itself was the only evidence of abuse. New Jersey’s highest court has now said, in a published and precedential decision, that this practice rests on a scientific foundation that has not been adequately tested, and that the field most directly responsible for that foundation has not reached consensus on its core premise.

This is what happens when a court takes seriously its role as a gatekeeper against unreliable expert evidence. Science adapted specifically to answer a legal question — rather than developed independently and later applied to one — deserves exactly this kind of scrutiny. The history traced in this opinion shows a theory that migrated from automobile whiplash research into infant medicine, gained momentum through repetition and institutional endorsement, and was never tested against the basic question of whether shaking an infant can actually generate the force the theory requires. That is not how reliable science works, and it is not how evidence that can take away someone’s liberty should reach a jury.

For families and defendants facing an SBS/AHT allegation in New Jersey, this decision is significant. It does not mean such a charge can never be proven — independent physical evidence of abuse remains fully admissible. But the diagnosis alone, offered as medical certainty that shaking without impact occurred, can no longer reach a New Jersey jury without first surviving the scrutiny this opinion demands.

Medicaid Eligibility for Lawfully Present Immigrants in New Jersey: What the New Federal Law Means for NJ FamilyCare

Medicaid Eligibility for Lawfully Present Immigrants in New Jersey: What the New Federal Law Means for NJ FamilyCare

Federal law is changing who qualifies for NJ FamilyCare. Beginning October 1, 2026, many lawfully present immigrants may lose their coverage. Congress passed the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, which President Trump signed into law in 2025. Among its many provisions is a significant restriction on Medicaid eligibility for non-citizen immigrants. Starting October 1, 2026, certain lawfully present immigrants who are currently enrolled in NJ FamilyCare — New Jersey's name for its Medicaid program — may no longer qualify.

This is not a future concern. NJ has already begun mailing letters to potentially affected members to gather information and assess eligibility before the October 1 deadline. If you or someone you know receives one of these letters, the worst thing to do is ignore it.

Who Is Affected

The changes target a specific set of immigration categories. The following groups of lawfully present non-citizens may lose NJ FamilyCare coverage on October 1, 2026:

  • Refugees;
  • Asylees;
  • Certified victims of trafficking and their spouse, child, sibling, or parents;
  • Veterans or active-duty military and spouses or unmarried dependents who also have qualified non-citizen status;
  • Iraqi and Afghani parolees;
  • Individuals who were paroled into the U.S. between February 24, 2022 and September 30, 2024 under the Ukrainian Humanitarian Parole (UHP) program; and
  • People whose deportation is being withheld.

What these categories share is that they represent people who entered the United States through humanitarian or protection-based pathways — people who, in many cases, fled violence or persecution. Under existing rules, federal law treated many of them as eligible for Medicaid. The new law removes that eligibility for those who have not taken a specific additional step: transitioning to Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR) status.

The Green Card Exception

Adjusting to LPR status — becoming a permanent resident with a green card — does not automatically solve the problem. The law imposes a five-year waiting period. If you transitioned to LPR status less than five years ago, you may still be ineligible. The five-year clock runs from the date the immigrant obtains qualified alien status.

There are, however, carve-outs to the five-year rule. If you originally arrived in one of the affected categories and you have since transitioned to LPR status, you may still qualify even if it has been less than five years. These categories include:

  • Refugees;
  • Asylees;
  • Certified victims of trafficking and their spouse, child, sibling, or parents;
  • Veterans or active-duty military and spouses or unmarried dependents who also have qualified non-citizen status;
  • Amerasian immigrants;
  • Iraqi and Afghani special immigrants and parolees;
  • Individuals who were paroled into the U.S. between February 24, 2022 and September 30, 2024 under the Ukrainian Humanitarian Parole (UHP) program; and
  • People whose deportation is being withheld.

The state has been directed to treat those individuals more favorably than others in the LPR-under-five-years category.

If that sounds complicated, it is. The intersection of immigration status and Medicaid eligibility has never been simple, and the new law adds another layer of complexity. If you are uncertain whether these changes apply to you, do not try to figure it out alone.

Who Is Not Affected

Not every non-citizen is at risk. In addition to the categories noted above, several groups will continue to qualify under the new rules including:

  • Lawful Permanent Residents of at least 5 years (calculated from date on green card);
  • Lawfully present non-citizens who are pregnant, or under the age of 21;
  • Cuban/Haitian Entrants;
  • Compact of Free Association (COFA) migrants, including individuals from Micronesia, Marshall Islands, and Palau; and
  • Children under 19, regardless of their immigration status.

These populations are protected by separate statutory provisions and should not see a change in their eligibility on October 1.

What New Jersey Is Already Doing

NJ FamilyCare is not waiting until October. The state has begun sending outreach letters to members whose immigration status may bring them within the affected categories. These letters are not yet termination notices — they are requests for information to help the state determine who remains eligible and who does not.

If NJ FamilyCare already has what it needs to confirm your continued eligibility, you will receive a letter telling you your coverage has been renewed. If it needs more, you will receive a request for documentation or a renewal packet. The critical thing is to respond promptly. Failing to respond can result in a gap or termination of coverage, even if you are actually still eligible.

Members should also make sure their contact information is current. If your address or phone number has changed, call NJ FamilyCare Customer Service at 1-800-701-0710 (TTY: 711) now, before any letter goes undelivered.

The Broader Picture

These changes do not exist in isolation. The same legislation that is cutting Medicaid eligibility for immigrants also introduces work and community engagement requirements for certain adult enrollees beginning January 1, 2027, and shortens the renewal period from annually to every six months for those in certain plans. The cumulative effect of these changes is a significant increase in administrative burden on the states and more paperwork for some of the most vulnerable Medicaid enrollees in the state.

New Jersey has historically taken steps to extend coverage to immigrant populations beyond what federal law requires but those programs cost money. Whether New Jersey will maintain state funded coverage options is an open question.

Learn More

For a detailed explanation of how immigration status affects NJ Medicaid eligibility under existing rules, see our guide: NJ Medicaid and Immigration Status — What You Need to Know.

For a broader overview of the federal Medicaid cuts in the One Big Beautiful Bill Act affecting New Jersey residents, see: Federal Medicaid Cuts: What New Jersey Residents Need to Know.

The official NJ DMAHS information page on these changes is available at nj.gov/humanservices/dmahs/obbba/medicaid-federal-changes.shtml. The state has indicated it will update that page as additional guidance becomes available.

New Jersey Appellate Court Clarifies Judge’s Role in Guardianship Cases

New Jersey Appellate Court Clarifies Judge’s Role in Guardianship Cases

When a court decides to appoint a state agency as guardian over a family member's objection, what due process is the family entitled to? Can a judge make that call based on attorney reports and physician certifications alone — without testimony, without cross-examination, and without detailed findings of fact?

The New Jersey Appellate Division in the case In re F.M.W., decided February 20, 2026, held that the trial court is obligated to first consider all the evidence and make findings by clear and convincing evidence as to whether the person is incapacitated, even if that issue is uncontested. Then when considering who to appoint as guardian the court cannot simply rely on the recommendations of the court-appointed attorney for the incapacitated person. The court must also weigh the wishes of the incapacitated person (such as what is stated in a Power of Attorney), and if the issue of who should be guardian is contested the court must permit discovery on the issue. Finally, the court must conduct a plenary hearing that allows the parties to present evidence, offer witnesses and have the opportunity to conduct cross-examination. 

Background

F.M.W. was an elderly woman suffering from advanced Alzheimer’s dementia. She lived with her sister, R.W., her only relative, who served as her primary caregiver. In 2014 — before her cognitive decline — F.M.W. had executed a durable Power of Attorney designating R.W. as her agent.

In late 2023, Adult Protective Services received an anonymous referral reporting concerns about F.M.W.’s care. Over the following months, a Protective Services social worker conducted multiple home visits and encountered resistance from R.W. — who allegedly refused to provide medical information, blocked access to F.M.W. on some occasions, and was described by F.M.W.’s former aide and a longtime friend as struggling with mental health issues, including paranoia. The court-appointed attorney, William Saxton, Esq., ultimately “strongly opposed” R.W.’s appointment as guardian, describing her as showing “signs of deep instability” and alleging that her neglect had compromised F.M.W.’s physical health.

On September 13, 2024, the probate court held a telephonic hearing. After hearing arguments from counsel and reviewing Saxton’s report and the physician certifications, the court found that R.W. would not be an “appropriate guardian” and appointed the New Jersey Office of the Public Guardian instead. The court issued no findings of fact, made no clear and convincing evidence determination on incapacity, and gave no analysis of F.M.W.’s best interests. F.M.W. died on July 29, 2025, before the appeal could be decided.

The Legal Framework: What NJ Courts Are Required to Do

New Jersey’s guardianship process is governed by N.J.S.A. 3B:12-24 to -35 and Rule 4:86-1 to -8. I covered the process in detail in my posts on Understanding Guardianship in New Jersey: Why It May Be Necessary and How to Obtain It, and What Happens After You’re Appointed Guardian in New Jersey. The procedural safeguards embedded in these rules exist for an important reason: a finding of incapacity results in an individual’s loss of the right of self-determination — one of the most fundamental rights recognized under the New Jersey Constitution.

When a guardianship proceeding reaches the hearing stage, the court is required to undertake a two-step analysis. First, the court must determine by clear and convincing evidence whether the individual is incapacitated. Second, upon making that finding, the court must determine whether to appoint a general or limited guardian and must select an appropriate individual to serve in that role.

On the second question — who should serve as guardian — New Jersey law establishes a clear preference. Under N.J.S.A. 3B:12-25, the Legislature has prioritized surrogate decision-makers in the following order: first, the incapacitated person’s spouse or domestic partner; next, their heirs or friends; and lastly, the Public Guardian. A family member’s preference “must be recognized unless it is shown to the court’s satisfaction that the appointment of next-of-kin would be affirmatively contrary to the best interests of the incapacitated person.” In re Roll, 117 N.J. Super. 122, 124 (App. Div. 1971).

The court may also consider the incapacitated person’s own prior expressed wishes — including a durable Power of Attorney, health care proxy, or advance directive. N.J.S.A. 3B:12-25; see also R. 4:86-4(a)(2).

What the Probate Court Got Wrong

The Appellate Division identified several distinct failures in the probate court’s handling of the case.

No findings on incapacity

Even though incapacity was uncontested, the probate court was still required to make formal findings by clear and convincing evidence. The absence of a dispute does not eliminate the obligation to analyze the evidence and state the basis for the court’s conclusions. The court simply summarized the physicians’ conclusions without conducting any independent analysis.

No consideration of limited guardianship

The court appointed a plenary guardian without considering whether a limited guardianship — one that preserved some of F.M.W.’s decision-making rights — might have been more appropriate. New Jersey law requires this analysis. A person who is incapacitated in some respects may still retain sufficient capacity to make certain decisions, such as where to live.

No consideration of the existing Power of Attorney

F.M.W. had executed a durable Power of Attorney in 2014 designating R.W. as her agent — an expression of her own wishes while she had capacity. The probate court made no mention of this document. While the court was free to give it whatever weight it deemed appropriate, failing to consider it at all was error.

No plenary hearing on the contested issue

This was the central failing. The question of who should serve as guardian was genuinely contested — R.W. denied the allegations against her, and the record contained positive observations contradicting the concerns raised by Protective Services and Saxton. Despite this, the court resolved the contest based on the testimony of court-appointed counsel and written reports alone, without the opportunity for discovery and presentation of evidence, other witness testimony, and without cross-examination. In sum, the Appellate Division found that R.W. did not have a meaningful opportunity to challenge the evidence against her.

The decision to appoint a guardian for an incapacitated person ‘made without evidential basis, without examination and cross-examination of lay and expert witnesses, and without a statement of reasons is untenable in the extreme.’ J.G. v. J.H., 457 N.J. Super. 365, 373 (App. Div. 2019).

The Appellate Division’s Holding

📌 Key Holding: When the appointment of a guardian is contested, due process requires: (1) findings by clear and convincing evidence on incapacity; (2) consideration of whether limited guardianship is appropriate; (3) consideration of the incapacitated person’s prior expressed wishes, including any POA; and (4) a plenary hearing in open court with testimony, limited discovery, and cross-examination on the contested issue of who should serve as guardian.

The court acknowledged that the Public Guardian may ultimately have been the correct choice — the decision had no bearing on the merits because F.M.W. had already died. The point was the process. Overriding the statutory preference for a family member, and overriding F.M.W.’s own documented choice of R.W. as her agent, required more than a telephonic hearing and consideration of one-sided reports.

The Appellate Division reversed the probate court’s order and issued the decision for publication — establishing it as precedent for future guardianship proceedings — specifically because the procedural issues raised were “capable of repetition, yet evading review.”

The Planning Lesson: Why Power of Attorney and Advance Directives Matter

The F.M.W. case is also a reminder of why advance planning matters. F.M.W. had the foresight to execute a Power of Attorney designating R.W. as her agent — an expression of her own wishes that the probate court failed to even mention. Had the court given that document its proper weight, it may have changed the analysis significantly. For more on the documents every New Jersey adult should have in place, see my posts on Durable Power of Attorney, Springing Power of Attorney, Living Wills, and Medical Decision Making.

Increase in the Medicaid Penalty Divisor Effective April 1, 2026

The New Jersey Department of Human Services, Division of Medical Assistance and Health Services issued Medicaid Communication No. 26-04 on April 6, 2026. The communication announces an increase in the Medicaid penalty divisor, effective April 1, 2026. The penalty divisor has increased from $402.74 to $420.67 per day.

The penalty divisor is the average daily cost of nursing home services in New Jersey, determined through an annual independent survey of all nursing facilities in the state. It is used to calculate the length of a Medicaid penalty period — the period of ineligibility imposed when an individual applying for Long Term Services and Supports (LTSS) has transferred assets for less than fair market value. The number of penalty days is calculated by dividing the value of the transferred asset by the daily penalty divisor, rounded down, with the penalty clock starting on the date the individual is otherwise determined eligible.

For a detailed discussion on transfer penalties read The 5-Year Lookback Rule in New Jersey: What It Is, How It Works, and Why Timing Matters.

Practitioners handling Medicaid planning matters involving asset transfers should update their calculations immediately. Read the full communication here.

When Liens Collide: DDD Can Collect Now, Medicaid Must Wait

When Liens Collide: DDD Can Collect Now, Medicaid Must Wait

A decision from the New Jersey Appellate Division published June 17, 2025 (In the Matter of G.W.) has clarified a critical and previously unsettled area of law concerning public benefit liens. The court held that a lien issued by the Division of Developmental Disabilities (DDD) is immediately enforceable, while a Medicaid lien cannot be collected until the beneficiary’s death — a distinction with significant consequences for estate planning.

The Background

Gabrielle W., an adjudicated incapacitated adult, received residential services funded by both DDD and Medicaid. When she inherited $600,000 from her sister’s estate, Arc of Bergen and Passaic Counties, her court-appointed property guardian, sought to protect her Medicaid eligibility by transferring those funds to a special needs trust. But standing in the way was a $1,052,304 lien from DDD for the cost of her care — a lien DDD sought to enforce immediately.

The trial court declined to enforce the DDD lien, ruling instead that Medicaid’s future estate recovery rights had priority. The court reasoned it was in Gabrielle’s best interest to preserve her Medicaid eligibility and protect the trust. But on appeal, the Appellate Division disagreed.

The Court's Holding

The Appellate Division reversed the lower court’s order, emphasizing that DDD liens are enforceable immediately under N.J.S.A. 30:4-80.1. These liens attach to the property of a living person who receives services from DDD. On the other hand, Medicaid liens can only be asserted posthumously, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4D-7.2, and only against the estate of the deceased Medicaid recipient.

The court concluded there is no statutory conflict: both liens can coexist, but they operate on distinct timelines. In the case of a living person like Gabrielle, DDD had the only legally viable lien. Medicaid’s recovery rights would not ripen until Gabrielle’s death.

Why This Matters

This case is a clear warning to guardians, trustees, and estate planners: Inherited assets cannot be shielded from DDD repayment obligations simply by invoking Medicaid's future claim rights. If a client receives services from DDD and comes into money, the DDD lien must be addressed promptly — either by repayment or through the statutory compromise process. The court also made clear that a “best interests” argument cannot override a legislatively mandated lien. Courts must enforce the statutes as written.

Planning Tip

If you have a loved one who receives public benefits like Medicaid or services from DDD, careful estate planning is essential. Leaving them an inheritance outright — even with good intentions — can jeopardize their benefits and trigger immediate repayment obligations. Instead, consider using special needs trusts or other protective planning tools to ensure their continued eligibility and long-term care without exposing them to liens or disruptions in services.

The G.W. case illustrates precisely what happens when protective planning is absent. Gabrielle's sister died intestate — without a will — which meant the $600,000 passed to Gabrielle outright under New Jersey's laws of intestate succession. There was no will directing those funds into a Special Needs Trust, no advance coordination with an elder law attorney, and no mechanism to receive the inheritance in a protected form. The result was an immediate lien enforcement proceeding that consumed the entirety of the inheritance and left nothing for Gabrielle's ongoing care needs.

Had Gabrielle's sister executed a will with proper special needs planning, she could have directed her estate — or the portion intended for Gabrielle — into a third-party Special Needs Trust. Unlike a first-party trust funded with the beneficiary's own assets, a third-party SNT is established with someone else's money and carries no Medicaid payback requirement at death. Gabrielle would have received the benefit of those funds without triggering the DDD lien, and without disrupting her Medicaid eligibility.

This is one of the most important and underappreciated points in elder law and disability planning: the person doing the planning is often not the disabled individual, but the family member who intends to leave them something. A parent, sibling, or other relative who has a loved one receiving public benefits should have a will — and that will should account for the beneficiary's disability. Leaving assets outright to a Medicaid or DDD recipient, however well-intentioned, can do more harm than good.