DMAHS Final Agency Decisions

Last updated: November 2026. Coverage: decisions posted for January through September 2026.

When a New Jersey Medicaid applicant or beneficiary disagrees with a county welfare agency, a managed care organization, or the Division of Medical Assistance and Health Services (DMAHS) itself, the dispute is resolved through a fair hearing. An administrative law judge hears the case and issues an initial decision; the Assistant Commissioner of DMAHS then adopts, modifies, or reverses it in a Final Agency Decision. Those final decisions are where the eligibility rules meet real facts — how transfer penalties are actually computed, what happens when a Qualified Income Trust is funded a month late, how much help a county must give an applicant who cannot get bank records. They decide the cases in front of them, and they are the best public evidence of how the program is actually administered. I wrote about the recent changes to the fair hearing process itself in my post on the fair hearing process changes, and the Medicaid Communications that set the underlying figures are organized on my Medicaid Communications index page.

DMAHS posts the decisions on its website by month, as a bare list of links to scanned PDF files. There are no summaries, no organization by subject, and no searchable text — the scans are images. As of late October 2026, the site lists the decisions issued from January through September 2026: 214 of them.

This page organizes all 214 by issue. Each entry gives the outcome, a short statement of what the decision holds, and a link to the official PDF. Decisions that announce a rule, resolve a recurring question, or reverse a county or an administrative law judge on a point that will matter in other cases carry a short "Why it matters" note. I read each decision; where the name in DMAHS's listing differs from the caption on the decision itself, the caption controls.

What the 2026 Decisions Show

Seventy-four of the 214 decisions — more than a third — turned on procedure: missed verification deadlines, requests for information, and how much help the county owed the applicant. The county's action was reversed or sent back in 33 of them. The recurring fact pattern is the one the Appellate Division addressed in M.L. v. Essex County and, this fall, in E.H. v. DMAHS and I.L. v. Middlesex County Board of Social Services: the county sat on an application for months, ignored a representative's calls and emails, or denied the application without ever saying what was missing. But the line has another side. Applicants who simply never sent what was asked lost, repeatedly — including L.G. v. Middlesex County, where the administrative law judge held that a county need not warn an applicant that his response to a request for information was incomplete, and J.A. v. Middlesex County, which held that the duty to assist does not include reminding an applicant about documents already requested.

Fifty-one decisions involved MLTSS and managed care, most of them fights over private duty nursing and personal care assistance hours. One observation recurs: the plans' "Acuity Tool" — the scoring instrument behind most nursing reductions — appears nowhere in the regulations. Five decisions rejected or sent back reductions that rested on the tool or on no demonstrated change in the member's condition, because a plan that cuts previously approved hours must show how the member's condition changed. Since July 2025, the DMAHS contract with the plans has required a notice reducing ongoing services to describe that change in plain language in the letter itself, and two decisions this year remanded reductions for failing exactly that requirement.

Qualified Income Trusts produced strict results. A trust funded with the wrong amount, or a Schedule A that no longer matched the deposits after a pension increase, was fatal. One decision went the other way: the Assistant Commissioner held that depositing $484.00 instead of $484.77 — a shortfall of seventy-seven cents a month, promptly corrected in good faith — was less than de minimis, and reversed the termination (J.D. v. DMAHS & Middlesex County). Whether that equity exception survives outside its own facts is an open question; the other Qualified Income Trust decisions this year allowed no slack at all.

Three appeals ended before the merits because of the representative's own paperwork: a designated authorized representative form bearing an unrecognizable signature, a form whose witness attested to a "previous signature" rather than witnessing the signing, and an appeal that could not continue after the applicant died, because a representative's authority ends at the applicant's death. In each case the underlying denial was never reviewed.

Fair Hearing Procedure and the Duty to Assist (74)

B.L. v Middlesex County (January 2026) — Affirmed. Denial for failure to verify under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.2(e) was upheld because B.L. did not timely provide all required facility and Bank of America verifications and no exceptional circumstances under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.3(c) required an extension, as she contributed to the delay.. Official decision (PDF)

E.H. v Union County (January 2026) — Affirmed. Denial of June 6, 2024 application affirmed because E.H. did not timely provide Bank of America statements May 1–November 1, 2024 and a revised Statement of Funeral Goods and Services by the November 22, 2024 RFI deadline, made no good-faith effort or request for assistance/extension, and showed no exceptional circumstances under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.2(e) and 10:71-2.3(c).. Official decision (PDF)

E.O. v Union County (January 2026) — Reversed. Denials of both consolidated MLTSS applications reversed as arbitrary and capricious because petitioner's representative substantially complied with requests to explain over 116 mostly cash transactions, the bank said further records did not exist, petitioner was medically unable to assist, and Union never offered more time or assistance under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.2 and 10:71-2.3 despite a 3-month delay, leaving Plaza Nursing Home unpaid over $190,000. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Reverses county on duty-to-assist/substantial-compliance grounds and involves a nursing-home provider with over $190,000 unpaid.

H.R. v Union County (January 2026) — Affirmed. Denial of February 26, 2025 application affirmed because, although proof of sale of the Middlesex home was provided late, H.R. never provided signed written verification of pre-admission residence in Plainfield or that he did not own the Plainfield home as required by N.J.A.C. 10:72-2(c) and (d), the son's statement being unsigned and undated, with no exceptional circumstances.. Official decision (PDF)

M.G. v Middlesex County (January 2026) — Affirmed. Denial of Medicaid Only application under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.2(e) was affirmed because petitioner provided only summary pages, not complete Bank of America Account #2374 statements with explanations of deposits, withdrawals, checks and transfers for May 1, 2024 to February 28, 2025, and no exceptional circumstances existed under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.3(c), though the ALJ noted the county never confirmed receipt, sent a deficiency letter, or assisted the DAR as required.. Official decision (PDF)

T.Y. v Atlantic County (January 2026) — Affirmed. Denial affirmed because petitioner failed to provide direct deposit verification/images for his Bank of America and TD accounts and his certificate of naturalization within the required time under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.2(e) and -2.3(a), with no exceptional circumstances under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.3(c) and no extension requested.. Official decision (PDF)

A.M. v Hudson County (February 2026) — Affirmed. Termination affirmed because petitioner failed to timely provide satisfactory information about her TD Bank accounts despite two requests for information, the agency having exercised the due diligence required by 42 CFR 435.952.. Official decision (PDF)

J.G. v Middlesex County (February 2026) — Reversed. Denial reversed and remanded because the county let more than eight months pass beyond the 90-day application period of N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.3(a) without acting and never issued a deficiency letter, breaching its duty to assist under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.2(c) and (d); the county must issue a deficiency letter and allow a reasonable response time before re-evaluating. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Reverses a county for an eight-month processing delay and failure to issue a deficiency letter, on duty-to-assist grounds.

J.R.A. v Atlantic County (February 2026) — Affirmed. Denial of the May 13, 2024 MLTSS application affirmed because petitioner failed to show the reasonable and continuous efforts to obtain Bank of America statements required to excuse the missed deadline under the E.M. five-factor exceptional-circumstances test (N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.3(c)); statements produced moments after the August 16, 2024 denial were a non sequitur. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Applies and distinguishes E.M. v. Middlesex's five-factor exceptional-circumstances test for third-party verification delays.

D.W. v Monmouth County (March 2026) — Affirmed. The denial for failure to provide verifications was upheld because the applicant's DAR admittedly overlooked several of the Board's eight requested items (property-sale and life-insurance verification, POA documents, QIT bank statements), and the ALJ held N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.2 imposes no affirmative duty on the Board to complete the verification process for the applicant. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Distinguishes the recent duty-to-assist cases (M.L. v. Essex County, K.O. v. DMAHS, F.C. v. Middlesex), holding they do not help an applicant who simply failed to respond to an RFI.

E.B. v Union County (March 2026) — Reversed. The failure-to-verify denial was overturned and the application ordered processed, because the documents the county demanded did not exist: there were no Warner Bros. Discovery statements before the April 2022 AT&T spinoff created the stock, and there is no "YSA Reimbursement Company" able to issue the requested letterhead letter confirming the twenty-two $152 deposits. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: County reversed on verification grounds where the applicant proved the requested verifications could not be produced.

L.G. v Middlesex County (March 2026) — Affirmed. The failure-to-verify denial was upheld because the DAR's RFI response omitted the QIT Schedule A and insurance-payment information, and the ALJ held a county is not required to tell an applicant that an RFI response is insufficient before denying, particularly where the applicant had assured the county that all required documents were submitted, under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.2(c) and (e). Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Squarely rejects a duty-to-assist duty to flag an incomplete RFI response, even though the county never answered the DAR's pre-denial emails asking whether anything more was needed.

L.J. v Gloucester County (March 2026) — Affirmed. The failure-to-verify denial was upheld because the petitioner admittedly never provided the Direct Express statements for May, June, and July 2025, and Direct Express's mail-only records process was held not to be exceptional circumstances excusing the failure under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.3(c).. Official decision (PDF)

N.C. v Atlantic County (March 2026) — Affirmed. The failure-to-verify denial was upheld because the petitioner never produced the TD Bank statements or the Chime, Cash App, and Venmo running balances requested in the county's second RFI, and the ALJ found no exceptional circumstances under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.3(c) justifying a further extension despite the DAR's cooperation.. Official decision (PDF)

R.J. v Middlesex County (March 2026) — Reversed. The failure-to-provide denial was reversed and the application ordered reopened because the county sat on the December 2024 application for eight months, sent its first RFI only in July 2025, denied five days after receiving documents without ever saying what was missing, and refused to consider the documents once counsel supplied them — conduct held to breach the county's duties under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.2(c) and 10:71-2.3 and the "turn square corners" principle of M.L. v. Essex County. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Full duty-to-assist reversal against Middlesex County on facts paralleling I.L., expressly applying M.L.'s joint duty of agency and applicant to communicate about a pending application.

B.C. v Camden County (April 2026) — Remanded. Matter remanded because, although the initial termination was proper, the renewal application filed 87 days after the coverage end date fell within the termination notice's 90-day reconsideration window and related back to the renewal, so the County had to process it and consider all documents submitted in response to its five RFIs. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Applies the 90-day reconsideration/relation-back rule, and finds the agency's claim of non-receipt failed where its own automated response proved receipt of the representative's email.

C.V. v Hudson County (April 2026) — Affirmed. Denial affirmed because petitioner never provided the requested verifications (including a lease and self-employment/income proof) by the November 5, 2025 deadline and showed no exceptional circumstances under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.3(c), so denial under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.2(e) was proper.. Official decision (PDF)

D.B. v Middlesex County (April 2026) — Remanded. Application returned to the County for a decision on the merits because the County breached its N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.2(c) duty to assist — it did not act on the application for five months, denied it two days after the applicant's status call without responding, and refused to review the documentation submitted October 24, 2025 — and failed to prove by a preponderance that petitioner had not timely provided verifications. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Duty-to-assist reversal applying M.L. v. Essex County and the "turn square corners" doctrine to a county that denied without notice of what was missing or a reasonable time to respond.

E.K. v Middlesex County (April 2026) — Affirmed. Denial affirmed because petitioner failed to provide the requested Santander checking and money-market documentation under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.2(e) with no exceptional circumstances, and was in any event over-resource as of July 1, 2025, since the $898 check written in August 2025 was not deposited until December 2025.. Official decision (PDF)

J.B. v Middlesex County (April 2026) — Affirmed. Denial affirmed because petitioner, after receiving an extension to July 17, 2025, submitted nothing and sought a second extension only after that deadline passed, so denial for failure to verify Bank of America records and American Water pension information under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.2(e) was proper.. Official decision (PDF)

J.C. v Union County (April 2026) — Dismissed. Appeal dismissed and MLTSS denial upheld because petitioner never supplied the specifically requested August 2024 Fidelity statement — for an account holding $139,931.28 on July 31, 2024, from which over $15,000 moved before its August 12, 2024 closure — and offered no explanation or extension request before the denial. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Distinguishes M.L. and K.O., the leading duty-to-assist authorities, holding they do not excuse an unexplained failure to produce a specifically requested statement.

S.F. v Mercer County (April 2026) — Affirmed. Denial affirmed because petitioner failed to provide documentation of all account transactions from August 1, 2024 to August 1, 2025 as required by N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.2(e), her testimony that she had submitted everything was found not credible, and no exceptional circumstances existed under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.3(c).. Official decision (PDF)

W.S. v Atlantic County (April 2026) — Affirmed. Denial affirmed because six categories of requested look-back verifications — including a $16,799.94 payment and a $3,000 transfer from an undisclosed account — were never provided, and the representative's two-day religious-holiday absence was not "exceptional circumstances" under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.3(c), extensions under that rule being discretionary under S.D. v. DMAHS.. Official decision (PDF)

A.S. v Middlesex County (May 2026) — Reversed. The failure-to-verify denial was overturned and the application ordered processed because exceptional circumstances existed under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.3(c): the applicant died during the process, the county's information request reached the representative late, the DAR substantially complied, and the county denied the application without ever considering her extension request or the documents she then supplied. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: County reversed after denying without considering an extension request or later-submitted verifications.

C.G. v Ocean County (May 2026) — Affirmed. The failure-to-verify denial was upheld because petitioner's written explanation of her changed income (premature birth, no return-to-work date) was insufficient and non-responsive to the request for pay-stub or employer verification, the Board gave her another opportunity to comply on September 30, 2025, and no exceptional circumstances existed under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.3(c).. Official decision (PDF)

C.M. v Union County (May 2026) — Reversed. The denial for failure to verify a CashApp account was reversed, with the verification deadline extended under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.3(c) and the September 5, 2025 application returned for processing, because the 82-year-old applicant fully cooperated, the CashApp records (showing no disqualifying transactions and activity of $45 or less) were obtainable only by subpoena, and the county did nothing to assist her as N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.2(c) requires. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: County faulted for breaching its duty to assist where the verification it demanded was unavailable to the applicant without a subpoena.

L.P. v Monmouth County (May 2026) — Affirmed. The failure-to-verify denial was upheld under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.2(e) because petitioner never supplied bank statements, pension verification, and explanations for transactions over $1,000, no exceptional circumstances existed, and the ALJ found the representative's testimony not credible — she claimed to have faxed the September and October 2024 bank statements on September 10, 2024, before those statements existed.. Official decision (PDF)

M.L. v Monmouth County (May 2026) — Reversed. The failure-to-verify denial was undone and the verification period extended under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.3(c) because the county issued its first request for information eight months after the portal application, the letter was returned undeliverable and never received by the applicant (as the county acknowledged at the hearing), and the county denied the application sixteen days after issuing the request. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Denial reversed on exceptional-circumstances grounds where the county's own information request never reached the applicant.

M.M. v Middlesex County (May 2026) — Reversed. The failure-to-verify denial was overturned and the case returned for processing because exceptional circumstances existed under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.3(c): the county's September 12, 2025 request letter did not reach the applicant's POA until October 1, after its September 26 due date, through a mail delay outside either party's control, she responded with the documents the next day, and the county denied the application without considering them or an extension. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: County reversed for denying without considering submitted verifications or an extension where its request arrived after its own deadline.

D.V. v Middlesex County (June 2026) — Reversed. The failure-to-verify denial was overturned and the application ordered processed because exceptional circumstances existed under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.3(c): the DAR timely uploaded all requested documents, a county portal transmittal failure dropped several bank statements, the caseworker never returned three calls that would have allowed a cure before the November 7, 2025 deadline, and the county denied without identifying what was missing. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Reverses a county on duty-to-assist/verification grounds — unanswered DAR calls, a portal failure, and a denial that never specified the deficiency.

J.C. v Hudson County (June 2026) — Dismissed. The appeal was denied for lack of standing because the DAR form bore an unrecognizable signature by an unidentified "A.M." and no power of attorney was produced to authorize it; the termination also stood on the merits because QIT and pension verifications were never provided within the 90-day window and no exceptional circumstances existed under 42 CFR 435.952(a)(3). Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Fair hearing lost at the threshold over a defectively executed Designated Authorized Representative form.

M.D. v Mercer County (June 2026) — Affirmed. Termination upheld and the appeal dismissed because petitioner never responded to the Board's May 30, 2025 Request for Information or provided the requested verifications within thirty days, and the Board may terminate benefits for such a failure under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.2(e). Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Delimits the N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.2(c) duty to assist — the Board must verify the information an applicant provides but is not required to undertake an independent investigation of the applicant (N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.2(b)(3); N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.10).

M.O. v Monmouth County (June 2026) — Reversed. Denial of an MLTSS application over a missing October 2019 Oppenheimer mutual fund statement was held inappropriate and the case returned to the county for processing, because the county waited six months to request verifications — well beyond the ninety-day frame of N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.3(a) — and failed to communicate with or assist the applicant's representative as N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.2(c) and (d) require, with exceptional circumstances found under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.3(c). Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Reverses a county on duty-to-assist grounds where the sole missing item was one month's statement from an account that generated only yearly statements and the applicant had otherwise substantially responded in good faith.

N.B. v Middlesex County (June 2026) — Reversed. The county was ordered to extend the verification time limit under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.3(c) because a pending guardianship made it impossible to obtain the requested bank records before the deadline — the banks would not release them until letters of guardianship issued — and the Board never responded to or considered counsel's emailed extension requests before denying the application on September 5, 2025. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Exceptional circumstances found where the county ignored documented extension requests (the assigned caseworker never received the emails) and conceded the applicant's representatives communicated in good faith.

T.D.F. v Union County (June 2026) — Reversed. MLTSS denial reversed and the application ordered reopened because petitioner timely and substantially complied with both Requests for Information, supplying Affinity Federal Credit Union letters confirming the three questioned accounts were not hers (they belonged to her mother), while the county denied the application six weeks later without seeking any clarification or giving fair notice that more was required, contrary to its obligations under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.2(c). Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Duty-to-assist reversal following M.L. v. Essex County Division of Family Assistance and Benefits (App. Div. 2025) — applicant and caseworker alike bear an affirmative regulatory duty to communicate and seek clarification before a verification denial may issue.

V.R. v Union County (June 2026) — Affirmed. MLTSS nursing home denial affirmed because petitioner never produced the requested PayPal statements covering April 1, 2017 to February 1, 2025 — sought because of transfers from petitioner's Chase account — even after an extension of time, and applicants are the primary source of the information required to establish eligibility (N.J.A.C. 10:71-1.6(a)).. Official decision (PDF)

W.B. vs Essex County (June 2026) — Reversed. ABD renewal denial reversed because the ALJ credited petitioner's testimony that he timely hand-delivered the requested DoorDash paystubs and bank statements to the designated box at the county office, which then failed to scan them into his file, so petitioner in fact cooperated and submitted documents as required by N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.1 et seq. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Reversal on verification grounds; the ALJ noted that in this and several other cases applicants hand-delivered documents that the Division, for unknown reasons, failed to acknowledge or timely scan into the applicant's file.

A.Q.A. v Mercer County (July 2026) — Reversed. Termination of a disabled child's Medicaid for failure to provide documentation was reversed because Mercer County never identified what documentation was missing, set no time frame to supply it, and sent notices to the wrong county after the family's 2023 move to Hunterdon County, breaching its duty to assist under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.2(c); the application was returned for a new eligibility determination. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Applies M.L. v. Essex County's "turn square corners" principle to reverse a county termination unsupported by any notice of missing verifications.

A.T. v Monmouth County (July 2026) — Affirmed. Denial of the Medicaid Only application was affirmed under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.2(e) because petitioner never provided verification of where her Social Security income was deposited during the five-year look-back (September 2019–April 2024) and showed no exceptional circumstances under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.3(c) justifying more time.. Official decision (PDF)

B.D. v Union County (July 2026) — Affirmed. Denial of the MLTSS application was affirmed because petitioner's representative, Future Care Consultants, failed to timely submit requested verifications (current pension statements, Prudential policy values, bank statements) and showed no good-faith cooperation or exceptional circumstances under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.3(c) and Medicaid Communication 22-04 to warrant an extension; the current Prudential documentation arrived only in April 2026.. Official decision (PDF)

B.G. v Union County (July 2026) — Remanded. Union County was ordered to extend the verification deadline under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.3(c) and process the MLTSS application because B.G. cooperated in good faith, supplying 33 of 34 requested items and asking what else was needed, while the county denied the application without ever telling him the Wells Fargo statements for one account had been inadvertently omitted, contrary to Medicaid Communication 22-04 and the M.L. duty to communicate. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Applies the M.L./Communication 22-04 good-faith extension rule against a county that denied without notice of the single missing item.

C.H. v Union County (July 2026) — Remanded. Union County was ordered to process the January 28, 2025 ABD application because, under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.3(c), when proof of eligibility is inconclusive the county must give the applicant a further opportunity to develop evidence; instead it took over six months, never answered the DAR's calls and email asking which bank-statement pages were missing, and denied the application. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Reverses a county on duty-to-assist grounds where the county ignored the representative's requests to identify missing statement pages.

D.D. v DMAHS & Atlantic County (July 2026) — Dismissed. The appeal of Atlantic County's termination for failure to provide documentation was dismissed for lack of standing because the Designated Authorized Representative form submitted by petitioner's representative (Future Care Consultants) was invalid — the applicant's signature was not contemporaneously witnessed (the witness annotated "witness to previous signature") — so the representative had no standing to request or appear at a fair hearing under 42 C.F.R. § 435.923 and N.J.A.C. 1:10B-5.1. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: DMAHS adopts a strict DAR-validity rule: an improperly witnessed DAR form defeats the representative's standing and ends the appeal without reaching the merits.

D.S. v Middlesex County (July 2026) — Remanded. The case was returned to Middlesex County to process the Medicaid Only application under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.2(c)(5) because the DAR had in fact supplied the requested verifications — including explanations for the $5,000 October 19, 2023 deposit, which Santander Bank could not image because it was not a check deposit — and the county denied the application without ever stating what was missing or inadequate, breaching its affirmative duty to communicate. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: ALJ found the county "completely and totally overlooked" documentation responsive to its own RFIs and denied on an unexplained failure-to-verify theory.

L.C. v Middlesex County (July 2026) — Reversed. Denial rescinded because Middlesex County took over six months to decide (past the 45-day limit in N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.3(a)), never sent the written delay notice required by N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.3(d), and never processed the DAR's extension requests — the caseworker's emails went unmonitored during her absence — so the case was returned for an eligibility determination counting the October 2025 submissions. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: County reversed for ignoring extension requests and blowing the 45-day deadline without the required written notice (N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.3; Medicaid Communication 22-04).

L.M. v Union County (July 2026) — Affirmed. MLTSS denial upheld because the DAR never supplied the Motor Vehicle Commission bill of sale for the car sold in 2021 or legible, complete PayPal statements, and there was no proof the DAR asked the county for help before the denial; the county met its obligations under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.2(e).. Official decision (PDF)

N.S. v Monmouth County (July 2026) — Reversed. Denial reversed and case returned for timely processing: the county left the February 12, 2025 application unassigned for seven months in violation of N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.3, and petitioner's one-third elective share of her late husband's estate ($28,396.90) was property in probate — an excludable resource under N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.4(b)(6) — so she only became over-resourced because of the county's delay; she died September 13, 2025, while the application sat. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: County's seven-month processing delay, combined with the probate exclusion, voids the denial — an applicant cannot be made over-resourced by the agency's own delay.

N.T. v Gloucester County (July 2026) — Affirmed. Denial upheld on both grounds: the November 2025 TD Bank statements for account #0614 were never provided (the experienced DAR never followed up on its extension request), and as of November 1, 2025 petitioner had $173,854.95 in liquid resources, above the $157,920 maximum community spouse resource allowance. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Distinguishes K.O. v. DMAHS and M.L. v. Essex County — where the missing documents were specifically requested from the outset, the county's silence on an extension request does not shift the burden to the county.

S.G. v Cumberland County (July 2026) — Dismissed. Appeal of a 562-day transfer penalty (alleged $226,360.36 transfer) dismissed for lack of standing (agency adopted the Initial Decision): petitioner died February 3, 2026, and a designated authorized representative's authority ends at the applicant's death under 42 C.F.R. § 435.923, so the appeal could not continue without authorization from petitioner's estate. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Confirms DAR authority terminates on the applicant's death — penalty appeals do not survive unless the estate authorizes a representative.

S.S. v Atlantic County (July 2026) — Affirmed. Denial affirmed under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.2(e): across three RFIs the applicant never supplied source proof for deposits of $500 or more — specifically a $42,941 Bank of America deposit and a $1,300 Chase deposit — and no exceptional circumstances existed under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.3(c).. Official decision (PDF)

S.W. v Atlantic County (July 2026) — Reversed. Denial undone and case returned for processing: the county denied the application because petitioner did not disclose a business, but a 2012 Certificate of Formation made his daughter the sole owner, and with a five-year look-back (N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.10(b)(9)) he was not required to report on a 2025 application a business he had not owned since at least 2012. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: County reversed on verification grounds — nondisclosure of an asset outside the five-year look-back cannot support a failure-to-verify denial.

V.D. v Middlesex County (July 2026) — Affirmed. Denial affirmed under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.2(e): by the extended August 25, 2025 deadline the applicant had not provided all requested verifications — including complete facility payment ledgers, deposit check images, and all pages of the Wells Fargo Qualified Income Trust bank statements — and no exceptional circumstances existed under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.3(c).. Official decision (PDF)

C.T. v Union County (August 2026) — Reversed. The county's denial was vacated and the May 30, 2025 application reopened because petitioner in good faith believed he had uploaded the requested financial statements (another client's documents were transmitted by mistake), the county never told him of the error or let him cure it, refused his December 2025 cure requests, and itself took 177 days without the delay notice required by N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.3 — failing to "turn square corners." Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Reverses a county denial on duty-to-assist grounds and orders the application reopened with 20 days to submit the verifications.

D.W. v Burlington County (August 2026) — Affirmed. Petitioner failed to provide the Medicaid redetermination application required under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.2(e), and no exceptional circumstances under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.3(c) justified more time, so the denial of the Medicaid Only application stands.. Official decision (PDF)

G.T. v Hudson County (August 2026) — Reversed. Exceptional circumstances under N.J.A.C. 10:72-2.1(d)(2) existed — a stroke-disabled petitioner could not gather the Direct Express statements and life-insurance information without a neighbor's help and the insurer's letters conflicted — so the verification deadline was extended and the county ordered to process the application, with reinstatement to September 1, 2025 if he is eligible. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: County termination undone on verification/exceptional-circumstances grounds, with retroactive reinstatement.

J.A. v Middlesex County (August 2026) — Affirmed. Petitioner never submitted the Santander bank statements requested by the March 3, 2026 RFI, never sought an extension, and showed no exceptional circumstances; the county's duty to assist under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.2(c) does not include reminding an applicant or DAR of documentation already requested, so the denial stands and the appeal was dismissed. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Holds the N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.2(c) duty to assist does not require the county to follow up on outstanding verifications.

J.G. v Union County (August 2026) — Reversed. The county denied the application for failure to document three investments (Dreyfus Liquid Assets, 700 Thoroughbred shares, Templeton Growth Fund) that appeared only in petitioner's 42-year-old divorce decree from her deceased ex-husband; the ALJ found exceptional circumstances under N.J.A.C. 10:72-2.1(d)(2), treated the DAR's March 26, 2026 letter as an extension request, and ordered the verification time extended. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Reverses a county denial on verification grounds where the county relied solely on a decades-old divorce decree and the fund companies confirmed no accounts existed.

J.M. v Hudson County (August 2026) — Affirmed. After three RFIs and multiple extensions for Merrill Edge statements (an account last showing a $7.25 balance), the DAR — who was not petitioner's POA — could not obtain them and the POA never acted despite Merrill Edge's direction, so no exceptional circumstances under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.3(c) justified another extension and the denial stands, distinguishing J.L. v. DMAHS.. Official decision (PDF)

M.M. v DMAHS & Hudson County (August 2026) — Affirmed. Petitioner admitted he voluntarily withdrew from Medicaid and appealed only because he changed his mind, which is not an exceptional circumstance under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.3(c), so the termination stands (reapplication not barred); the agency head adopted the result but held the Initial Decision was wrongly treated as deemed adopted and unreviewable, since that treatment is limited to failure-to-provide, excess-resource, and excess-income cases. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Agency head clarifies the limits of deemed adoption under 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(e)(14)(A) and N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(f).

M.P. v Hudson County (August 2026) — Affirmed. Petitioner admitted he did not timely answer the May 16, 2025 RFI seeking Chase bank account and transfer information and produced no copies of his claimed December 1, 2025 submission, so the county could not determine financial eligibility and termination was proper under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.2(e).. Official decision (PDF)

M.W. v Union County (August 2026) — Affirmed. Across three RFIs the DAR never fully verified petitioner's many life insurance policies — premium payments to United of Omaha, Pioneer American, and Globe Life remained unmatched to policies, and the Foresters ($505.44 cash surrender value) and Colonial Penn ($692.31) policies described as inactive were active — so no exceptional circumstances under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.3(c) existed and, under Medicaid Communication 22-04, the application was denied and petitioner must reapply; the denial letter's truncated legal citation was harmless.. Official decision (PDF)

N.B. v DMAHS (August 2026) — Remanded. DMAHS's denial of the NJ FamilyCare application was vacated and the case remanded because the agency produced no written notice that a federal 1040 (rather than the NJ 1040 submitted) was required and supported the alleged oral notice only through unproduced case notes read by its witness — hearsay without a residuum of competent evidence (Weston; N.J.A.C. 1:1-15.5(b)) — while 42 C.F.R. § 435.952(c)(2) requires the agency to say what verification is needed and allow a reasonable time to furnish it. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Vacates a DMAHS denial on notice and duty-to-assist grounds and requires effective communication of the exact verifications needed.

N.D. v Essex County (August 2026) — Mixed. In consolidated appeals, the denial of the August 28, 2024 application was affirmed because the agency in effect granted the requested extension to October 24, 2024 for missing Chime Bank statements and petitioner let it pass in silence, but the denial of the October 30, 2024 application was reversed as arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable: the DAR timely supplied the requested statements, explained there was no PNA account, and sent nine emails the agency never answered, contrary to its N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.2(c) duty to assist and the "turn square corners" doctrine (M.L. v. DMAHS); the second application was approved with retroactive benefits limited to July and August 2024. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Splits two denials by the same county and reverses one on duty-to-assist/communication grounds, applying M.L. and Pangborne.

R.R.C. v Essex County (August 2026) — Affirmed. The overseas-based DAR did not actually receive the mailed RFI until the county emailed it on March 12, 2026, but he requested no extension and answered two days after the March 16 deadline; because 42 C.F.R. § 435.918 does not require counties to email RFIs and Medicaid Communication 22-04 bars accepting documentation after a denial, the denial stands (petitioner later qualified on a new application effective March 2026). Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Holds the § 435.918 electronic-notice election does not extend to RFIs, so mailing to the address of record is sufficient.

S.M. v Monmouth County (August 2026) — Affirmed. Petitioner failed to document where her Social Security income was deposited from May 2020 through July 2025 — the checks went into her daughter's account and the daughter refused to provide statements — and also failed to supply proof of her spouse's death and a proper self-attestation, with no exceptional circumstances under N.J.A.C. 10:72-2.1(d)(2), so the denial under N.J.A.C. 10:72-2.1(c) stands (she was later approved on a second application retroactive to November 1, 2025).. Official decision (PDF)

W.C. v Cumberland County (August 2026) — Affirmed. Although the DAR cooperated, numerous verifications remained outstanding as of March 10, 2025 because the DAR depended on third parties to respond, the county gave ample opportunity to submit them, and no exceptional circumstances under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.3(c) existed, so the denial under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.2(e) stands (a second application was approved effective March 1, 2025, with retroactive benefits).. Official decision (PDF)

C.L. v Monmouth County (September 2026) — Reversed. A failure-to-verify denial (items included $135,293.58 in condo-sale proceeds and a $50,589.84 life-insurance balance) was overturned because the county waited seven months to issue its RFI, never notified the DAR of the delay, and the DAR credibly testified she never received it; the county must reissue the RFI and extend the verification period under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.3(c). Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: County reversed on duty-to-assist/communication grounds.

C.S. v Warren County (September 2026) — Affirmed. Failure-to-verify denial of the April 2026 MLTSS application was upheld because petitioner produced no documents showing the AVS-flagged Valley National Bank account (No. 6585, about $60,000, titled in his sole name and SSN) was not his — the bank letter covered only his former employer's account and the contrary testimony was hearsay.. Official decision (PDF)

D.B. v Burlington County (September 2026) — Reversed. Failure-to-provide-information denial was overturned and the application ordered processed because, after the DAR's voluminous RFI responses, the county never said her proof for two deposits ($23,990.41 and $18,000, both stepmother inheritances) was insufficient, breaching its affirmative duty to communicate under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.2(c). Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: County reversed on duty-to-assist grounds; denial notice never identified what was missing.

H.M. v Essex County (September 2026) — Affirmed. ABD renewal denial was affirmed even though the ALJ found petitioner had actually cooperated — her timely submitted documents were never scanned into her file — because she lived in Neptune (Monmouth County), so Essex County lacked jurisdiction and her renewal belonged in Monmouth. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: ALJ found the agency lost the applicant's documents yet affirmed on county-of-residence jurisdiction.

J.P. v Union County (September 2026) — Mixed. The ALJ found no exceptional circumstances and upheld the failure-to-verify denial of the Special Medicaid/MLTSS application — statements showing where petitioner's SSA benefits were deposited in 2022–2023 were never supplied despite over three months — yet the order form also directs the county to extend the verification period under N.J.A.C. 10:72-2.1(d)(2).. Official decision (PDF)

K.C. v Middlesex County (September 2026) — Reversed. Failure-to-provide-information denial was overturned and the county ordered to process the application because counsel responded extensively and sought extensions in good faith for archived bank records the banks needed at least 15 days to produce, while the county never returned calls and did not identify what was missing until two months after denying. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: County reversed on duty-to-assist/communication grounds.

L.G. v DMAHS & Mercer County (September 2026) — Mixed. DMAHS reversed the ALJ in part, holding Mercer County should have granted a further verification extension because the DAR was cooperating in good faith (and noting a blanket policy against second extensions would be improper), but the March 1, 2025 eligibility effective date stands because categorical disability eligibility was not met until the Medical Review Team's March 2025 PA-5 approval, making the December 2024 application's denial moot. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Agency head announces the good-faith-cooperation extension rule and rejects blanket no-second-extension policies.

M.F.A. v DMAHS & Middlesex County (September 2026) — Reversed. Failure-to-verify denial was rescinded and the application returned for processing because petitioner substantially complied in good faith (only a Wells Fargo business-account verification was outstanding, delayed beyond her control) while the county ignored two requests for assistance and missed the 45-day deadline without the written delay notice required by N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.3(d). Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: County reversed on duty-to-assist grounds.

Income and Resources, Including Qualified Income Trusts (54)

B.A. v Camden County (January 2026) — Affirmed. Termination upheld because B.A.'s countable income of $1,711 exceeded the $1,305 monthly limit and her resources of $15,920.44 exceeded the $4,000 limit under N.J.A.C. 10:72-4.5(b), so she was ineligible in March 2025.. Official decision (PDF)

D.B. v Union County & DMAHS (January 2026) — Reversed. DMAHS adopted the ALJ and ordered Union County to recalculate Petitioner's 2024 cost share and reissue the PR-1 to include her timely-reported Horizon Medigap and prescription premiums — erroneously omitted despite N.J.A.C. 10:53A-4.1 requiring deduction of health insurance premiums from available income (executor contended cost share should have been about $1,100 rather than $1,576), with the March 20, 2025 notice falling within the 11-month PR-1 adjustment window. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: DMAHS reversed the county even though it had instructed the county not to update the PR-1, holding basic fairness and N.J.A.C. 10:53A-4 required correction.

D.N. v Union County (January 2026) — Dismissed. The denial was upheld and the appeal dismissed because Petitioner's gross countable income of $13,843.79 exceeded the cost-of-care standard under N.J.A.C. 10:71-3.1 — the $440-per-day private room rate at Spring Grove — and no facts supported any income exclusions.. Official decision (PDF)

A.A. v Hudson County (February 2026) — Reversed. Termination of Special Medicaid reversed and petitioner held income eligible as of March 18, 2025, because although his $1,493 monthly SSI income exceeded the $1,305 limit, he qualified for the New Jersey WorkAbility Program, and credible testimony showed the $25 per week his sister paid him for household chores had been disclosed to the agency, under N.J.A.C. 10:72-4.1. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: County terminated benefits over $25/week in earnings it said were undisclosed; the ALJ found the payments had been documented by letter as in prior renewals and petitioner's RFI response was appropriate given the agency's own instructions.

B.C. v Essex County (February 2026) — Affirmed. NJ FamilyCare denial affirmed because petitioner's combined household income of $3,074 per month exceeded the $3,065 maximum by $9, and the limit allows no flexibility even after the five percent set-aside, under N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.1.. Official decision (PDF)

B.F. v Middlesex County (February 2026) — Affirmed. The county's determination stands: including petitioner's house in countable resources ($436,231.89 against the $2,000 standard) was correct because she never established a plan of liquidation under Medicaid Communication 87-26 — the house was listed only about three months and was off the market when the application was denied — leaving her resource eligible only as of July 1, 2024, under N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.5. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Reasons through Medicaid Communication 87-26's plan-of-liquidation exclusion for a home listed for sale and holds intermittent listing insufficient.

D.C. v Atlantic County (February 2026) — Affirmed. Special Medicaid denial affirmed because petitioner's countable income of $1,421 exceeded the $1,305 household-of-one standard, and the $202.90 he pays monthly for Medicare is not a recognized deduction from unearned income, under N.J.A.C. 10:72-4.1 and Medicaid Communication 25-03. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Holds a beneficiary's Medicare premium cost is not deductible from unearned income in the Special Medicaid 100%-of-FPL calculation.

E.G. v Union County (February 2026) — Affirmed. Denial affirmed because petitioner's household of two had monthly income of at least $2,488, exceeding the $2,433 limit, making her ineligible under N.J.A.C. 10:78-1.1(b), N.J.A.C. 10:70, and 42 CFR 435.119(b)(5).. Official decision (PDF)

N.C. v Morris County (February 2026) — Affirmed. Denial affirmed because petitioner's resources of $3,436.15 exceeded the $2,000 limit under N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.5, applying the first-moment-of-the-month rule of N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.1(e) to a $1,891.07 month-end TIAA payment. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Applies the first-moment-of-the-month resource rule to a month-end annuity payment.

P.S. v Essex County (March 2026) — Reversed. The excess-resource denial was reversed because resource eligibility is measured at the first moment of the first day of the month for which eligibility is sought: the county used the October 1, 2025 bank balance of $2,253.15, but the November 1, 2025 balance was $253.15, under the $2,000 limit in N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.5(c).. Official decision (PDF)

R.P. v Essex County (March 2026) — Affirmed. The termination for excess resources was upheld because the only statement the petitioner gave the county with his July 18, 2025 application showed a bank balance of $2,751.84, over the $2,000 limit in N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.5(c), and the statement showing a July 1, 2025 balance of $1,146.64 was not provided until November 2025, after coverage had already ended.. Official decision (PDF)

S.G. v DMAHS & Monmouth County (March 2026) — Remanded. DMAHS reversed the ALJ's summary decision and remanded for a full hearing in this challenge to a denial for improper QIT funding, holding the record did not establish the premise of the petitioner's arguments — that she actually owed tax on her NYCERS pension (gross $5,297.96 per month, about $305 withheld) — or show the income sources behind the QIT deposits, as needed to test the "entire check" deposit rule of Medicaid Communication 14-15. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Frames the open QIT question whether tax withheld from a pension is "income" that must be deposited whole into the QIT, and refuses to decide it without a factual record.

A.R. v Essex County (April 2026) — Affirmed. NJ FamilyCare denial affirmed because the household's $5,833 monthly income exceeded the $3,458 limit for a family of four, and no deduction is available for amounts withheld from SSDI benefits to repay an overpayment.. Official decision (PDF)

B.P. v Middlesex County (April 2026) — Reversed. Denial reversed because the $479.75 unused-vacation payout was nonrecurring lump-sum income under N.J.A.C. 10:78-4.3(c) that could support at most a period of ineligibility, not an outright denial; excluding it, petitioner's MAGI of $2,395.44 was under the $2,433 limit, so coverage was ordered from August 12, 2025, subject to the (c) offset calculation. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Applies N.J.A.C. 10:78-4.3(c)'s nonrecurring lump-sum rule and faults the County for denying without seeking any verification of the payout.

D.P. v Union County (April 2026) — Reversed. Excess-resource denial reversed because the deceased estranged husband's $160,000 Newark condo was in probate and excludable under N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.4(b)(6)(i), and his M&T bank accounts passed to his daughter as joint owner and were inaccessible to petitioner under (b)(6), leaving her countable resources at $1,495.61, under the $2,000 standard, with resource eligibility as of April 1, 2025. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Notable application of the probate and inaccessible-resource exclusions of N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.4(b)(6) to a deceased spouse's assets.

H.P. & G.P. v DMAHS (April 2026) — Affirmed. Medicare Savings Program denial affirmed because DMAHS may measure MSP eligibility against household sizes of one or two only — neither federal law (the CMS family-size rule being under a congressional moratorium through September 2034) nor N.J.S.A. 30:4D-3(i)(15)(a) and N.J.A.C. 10:72-4.1(b) requires a household-of-three standard — and the couple's $28,944 income exceeded all 2025 married-couple MSP limits. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Resolves a pure legal challenge to DMAHS's MSP household-size practice, distinguishing G.C. v. DMAHS on the differing statutory text and legislative history.

J.D. v DMAHS & Middlesex County (April 2026) — Reversed. The Assistant Commissioner reversed the Initial Decision upholding termination for December 2024 through April 2025, holding that depositing $484.00 instead of $484.77 into the QIT — a $0.77 monthly shortfall promptly and in good faith corrected — was less than de minimis, so the QIT was properly funded and petitioner remained eligible. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Agency-head decision recognizing a de minimis/equity exception to strict QIT full-funding under Medicaid Communication 14-15, reversing the ALJ.

J.P. v Bergen County (April 2026) — Affirmed. ABD termination affirmed because petitioner's $6,788 monthly income exceeded the program income limit, and Medicaid allows no deduction for amounts withheld from Social Security Disability benefits to repay an overpayment.. Official decision (PDF)

M.Y. v Bergen County (April 2026) — Affirmed. Excess-income denial affirmed because countable income of $1,943.33 — net earned income of $1,440 plus $503.33 of in-kind unearned income for living in his daughter's household — exceeded the $1,763 standard for a household of two under N.J.A.C. 10:71-5.6.. Official decision (PDF)

R.U. v Middlesex County (April 2026) — Affirmed. Special Medicaid denial affirmed because countable income of $1,325 exceeded the $1,305 household-of-one standard under N.J.A.C. 10:72-4.1, notwithstanding petitioner's argument that the lower income limit applicable after age sixty-five amounts to age discrimination.. Official decision (PDF)

M.J. v Atlantic County (May 2026) — Affirmed. The termination of NJ Care/Special Medicaid benefits effective January 31, 2026 was upheld because the couple's countable monthly income of $2,100.48 (Social Security and two pensions, after the $20 disregard) exceeded the $1,763 standard for a household of two under N.J.A.C. 10:72-4.1.. Official decision (PDF)

N.A. v Middlesex County (May 2026) — Affirmed. The termination of NJ FamilyCare benefits was affirmed because household income of $5,406 exceeded the $3,330 limit for the program, a calculation petitioner did not dispute (the children remained covered under a separate state-administered program).. Official decision (PDF)

N.D. v Middlesex County (May 2026) — Reversed. The excess-resources denial was reversed and petitioner found resource-eligible as of November 1, 2023, because the jointly held $240,942.17 ETrade account was not an available resource — under a guardianship settlement her guardian could retain only $20,000, the joint holder (her daughter) refused the confirmation ETrade required for any transfer, and under F.F. v. DMAHS resources inaccessible through no fault of the applicant may not be counted — leaving countable resources of $105.07 against the $2,000 limit. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Applies the inaccessible-resource rule to exclude a roughly $241,000 joint brokerage account the incapacitated applicant could not reach.

R.A. v Burlington County (May 2026) — Affirmed. The excess-income denial was upheld because petitioner's countable income of $2,391.18 (earned income of $4,867.26 less $1,876.18 in exclusions) exceeded the $1,763 standard under N.J.A.C. 10:71-5.6.. Official decision (PDF)

R.G. v DMAHS (May 2026) — Reversed. DMAHS's termination of NJ FamilyCare coverage was reversed and coverage ordered reinstated because the MAGI household is four — petitioner, his spouse, and their two children — since a spouse's income is always counted in the household under Medicaid Communication 14-12 and 42 C.F.R. § 435.603, so the couple's married-filing-separately tax status did not shrink the household to three, and monthly MAGI income of $3,612 is under the limit for a household of four. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Rejects DMAHS's position that spouses filing taxes separately reduce the MAGI household size.

W.J. v Gloucester County (May 2026) — Affirmed. The NJ Care denial was sustained because petitioner's countable resources of $19,183.92 (bank accounts including inherited funds, plus a $9,910 vehicle) exceeded the $4,000 resource limit — indeed, even excluding the inheritance from his mother's estate, the value of one of his two vehicles alone put him over the limit.. Official decision (PDF)

A.D. v Camden County (June 2026) — Affirmed. Termination of MLTSS benefits upheld because the POA never provided verification of ownership of the bank account ending in 8162 or a closing statement for the prior QIT account by the August 29, 2025 deadline, and the agency had no authority to waive the verification requirements. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Reasons through QIT documentation requirements — an updated Schedule A and proof the prior QIT account was closed, not merely reduced to a zero balance.

A.L. v Essex County (June 2026) — Affirmed. Denial of the Medicaid Only application upheld because petitioner never provided the requested Qualified Income Trust documentation and no exceptional circumstances existed under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.3(c), the claimed extension request being unauthenticated and the DAR absent from the hearing.. Official decision (PDF)

A.L. v Essex County 2 (June 2026) — Affirmed. Denial upheld because income routed through a QIT still counts toward eligibility, and petitioner's total monthly income of $17,216.24 — including $14,699.45 in annuity payments — exceeded his $16,229.75 cost of care (nursing home care at $507.80 per day plus a $487.95 monthly supplemental premium), making him income-ineligible under N.J.A.C. 10:71-5.6. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Holds QIT income counts in the cost-of-care comparison and flags that a QIT funded with resources rather than income is itself grounds for denial.

D.C. v Middlesex County (June 2026) — Affirmed. Termination upheld because petitioner's countable income of $1,405 per month (Social Security RSDI of $1,425 less the $20 exclusion) exceeded the $1,305 Medicaid Only income standard under N.J.A.C. 10:71-5.6.. Official decision (PDF)

L.B. v Hudson County (June 2026; listed by DMAHS as "L.B. v Middlesex County"; the decision is captioned against the Hudson County Department of Family Services) — Affirmed. Denial of the Medicaid Only application upheld because the DAR provided most of the requested documents but never the Qualified Income Trust documentation, and no exceptional circumstances existed under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.3(c).. Official decision (PDF)

L.D. v Salem County (June 2026) — Affirmed. Denial of the November 6, 2025 application upheld because the DAR never supplied the requested PNC bank statements — blaming an uncooperative fiduciary — and never requested an extension, so no exceptional circumstances existed under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.3(c); a later application was approved with retroactive coverage from October 1, 2025.. Official decision (PDF)

L.M. v Cumberland County (June 2026) — Affirmed. Special Medicaid denial upheld because petitioner's countable income of $2,223 per month exceeded the $1,305 standard for a household of one under N.J.A.C. 10:72-4.1, as petitioner herself conceded.. Official decision (PDF)

M.A. v DMAHS (June 2026) — Affirmed. Termination of NJ FamilyCare benefits affirmed because the household's gross monthly income of $5,200 exceeded the $4,207 program limit for a household of five, and living expenses such as rent, car payments, insurance, and utilities cannot be deducted in determining eligibility.. Official decision (PDF)

M.C. v Union County (June 2026) — Affirmed. NJ FamilyCare denial affirmed because petitioner's $1,120 in monthly Social Security disability benefits plus $713 in gross monthly earnings totaled $1,833, above the $1,800 limit for a household of one, and the program counts gross rather than net earnings under N.J.A.C. 10:71-5.1.. Official decision (PDF)

V.W. v Middlesex County (June 2026; listed by DMAHS as "V.W. v Essex County"; the decision is captioned against the Middlesex County Board of Social Services) — Affirmed. Denial affirmed, with petitioner ineligible for Medicaid before September 1, 2025, because her two bank accounts held $2,456.40, above the $2,000 individual resource limit of N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.5, even though $1,500 of that amount was a Social Security check her daughter had deposited into a representative payee account and forgotten to forward to the nursing home.. Official decision (PDF)

W.P. v Mercer County (June 2026) — Affirmed. Excess-resources denial affirmed because petitioner's available and countable resources totaled $2,311.68 — $1,544.62 in a Direct Express account and $767.06 in a Bank of America account — above the $2,000 limit of N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.5, and the Direct Express funds were properly counted because petitioner had access to the account through his daughter as power of attorney, the lost card notwithstanding, since the 138-day delay in providing Direct Express a valid ID was his own representative's failure.. Official decision (PDF)

A.S. v Somerset County (July 2026) — Affirmed. Termination affirmed because petitioner's monthly income of $1,802 ($1,676 Social Security plus $126 pension) exceeded the $1,305 ABD Medicaid income limit under N.J.A.C. 10:71-5.1, and she offered no proof that her Social Security benefits had stopped.. Official decision (PDF)

A.T. v Essex County (July 2026) — Reversed. Denial of the September 30, 2024 application was reversed as arbitrary and capricious because Essex County already possessed the complete Qualified Income Trust (emailed to its caseworker on August 9, 2024) and, under Medicaid Communication 22-04, verifications from a previous application must be used in a new application; relief was limited to PEME for June and July 2024. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Reasons through QIT documentation and holds the county to verifications already in its possession under Communication 22-04.

C.M. v Monmouth County (July 2026) — Affirmed. Denial affirmed because the $2,505.69 cash value of petitioner's whole life insurance policy exceeded the $2,000 Medicaid Only resource limit (N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.5(c)) as of the first moment of December 2025, the renewal month, and his later surrender of the policy and purchase of a $2,562.55 irrevocable prepaid funeral trust could not cure that month under the first-moment rule of N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.5(a)(1).. Official decision (PDF)

E.C. v Ocean County (July 2026) — Affirmed. Termination affirmed because the household's countable monthly income of $7,565.92 exceeded the $4,449 NJ FamilyCare income limit for a family of five (N.J.A.C. 10:78-4.1), real estate losses do not offset countable income, and petitioner's spouse was not entitled to continued pregnancy coverage under N.J.A.C. 10:78-4.1(g)(1) because she was not income-eligible when she became pregnant.. Official decision (PDF)

J.L. v Essex County (July 2026) — Mixed. Essex County's denial was upheld for July and September–December 2025 because petitioner's $1,440 monthly pension, routinely deposited at the end of the preceding month, counted as a resource at the first moment of each month under N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.1(e), putting him over the $2,000 limit, and SSA POMS SI 01140.200 on early deposits is not a rule and cannot override the regulation — but he was under the limit in August 2025, so the county had to pay that month's outstanding unpaid medical expenses. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Reasons through the income-versus-resource first-moment rule for MLTSS and squarely rejects the POMS early-payment instruction as non-binding.

M.O. v Union County (July 2026) — Affirmed. Termination upheld: petitioner's Social Security of $1,357/month, reduced by the $20 disregard to $1,337, exceeded the $1,330 Medicaid Only income cap (N.J.A.C. 10:72-4.1) by $7.. Official decision (PDF)

R.B. v DMAHS (July 2026) — Affirmed. Medicaid Only denial affirmed on corrected reasoning: DMAHS's $25,438/month figure rested on stale 2023 tax returns, but petitioner's $98,500 voluntary withdrawal from a Vanguard investment account counts as income under N.J.A.C. 10:71-5.1(b) — taxability is irrelevant and no N.J.A.C. 10:71-5.3 exclusion applies — putting monthly income at $10,916 against the $3,698 MAGI limit (138% FPL) for a household of four. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Holds a voluntary withdrawal from a non-retirement investment account is countable Medicaid Only income even though it is not taxable income.

T.K. v Bergen County (July 2026) — Affirmed. Denial affirmed: petitioner's monthly income of $3,632.60 far exceeds the $1,330 aged/blind/disabled Medicaid limit (N.J.A.C. 10:72-4.1); the decision also notes a $1.6 million IRA and a $1.5 million life insurance policy.. Official decision (PDF)

T.K. v DMAHS (July 2026) — Affirmed. Termination upheld: petitioner's unemployment benefits of $761 per week equal $3,297.41 in monthly countable income, well over the $1,800 program limit for 2025 under N.J.A.C. 10:71-5.6.. Official decision (PDF)

T.R. v Ocean County (July 2026) — Affirmed. Denial affirmed: petitioner's Social Security income of $2,120 per month (verified through the State On-Line Query) exceeds the $1,836 MAGI maximum for a household of one (133% of the federal poverty level; 42 C.F.R. § 435.119(b)(5)).. Official decision (PDF)

I.G. v Middlesex County (August 2026) — Affirmed. The QIT was not properly funded because Schedule A listed the DFAS pension at $478 per month but $505 was actually deposited after the pension increased, and Schedule A must be amended before changed amounts are deposited (Medicaid Communication 14-15; J.M.); the ALJ also held the Schedules' lack of dates or notarization was not itself fatal. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Detailed QIT/Schedule A ruling distinguishing J.M., S.F., K.B. and E.G. on when funding mismatches invalidate a QIT.

L.S. v Hunterdon County (August 2026) — Affirmed. Petitioner's undisputed gross monthly income of $1,839 exceeded the $1,330 Medicaid income limit under N.J.A.C. 10:71-5.1, so termination of benefits was proper.. Official decision (PDF)

L.K. v Bergen County (August 2026) — Affirmed. After petitioner's MLTSS coverage ended by a recorded voluntary disenrollment effective September 30, 2025, the county assessed her under ABD Medicaid, and her countable monthly income of $1,837 ($1,857 RSDI less the $20 disregard) exceeded the $1,330 limit in N.J.A.C. 10:72-4.1; the ALJ made no finding on the disenrollment itself.. Official decision (PDF)

G.L. v Middlesex County (September 2026) — Affirmed. Excess-income denial upheld: countable income of $1,391.50 (earned income $2,848 less $1,456.50 in exclusions) exceeded the $1,330 Medicaid Only income standard.. Official decision (PDF)

R.E. v DMAHS (September 2026) — Affirmed. Denial of QMB/SLMB/QI Medicare Savings Program benefits was upheld because eligibility uses gross income, and the couple's gross household income of $2,465.83 per month exceeds the $2,435 SLMB/QI limit for a married couple under Medicaid Communication 26-03.. Official decision (PDF)

R.M. v Camden County (September 2026) — Affirmed. Termination of Medicaid Only benefits was upheld because countable income of $1,465 per month (Social Security of $1,485 less the $20 disregard) exceeds the $1,305 ABD limit for a household of one.. Official decision (PDF)

T.M. v Essex County (September 2026) — Affirmed. Excess-income ABD denial was upheld because petitioner's Social Security Disability income of $1,463 per month exceeded the $1,255 household-of-one limit; the ALJ noted Workability, MLTSS, or GetCoveredNJ as possible alternative coverage routes.. Official decision (PDF)

MLTSS and Managed Care Denials (51)

B.A. v DMAHS & OCCO (January 2026) — Affirmed. OCCO's denial of clinical eligibility was adopted because B.A. was independent in all ADLs and needed only limited help with meal preparation and shopping, so she did not meet the NFLOC criteria under N.J.A.C. 10:166.. Official decision (PDF)

J.B. v Horizon NJ Health (January 2026) — Affirmed. DMAHS adopted the ALJ's decision upholding Horizon's reduction of PDN hours from 12 hours per day, 7 days per week to 8 hours per day, 7 days per week, because the supplemented record on remand showed Petitioner's condition had improved (no longer needing sleep-disturbance, lift, ROM, or oxygen points) and the February 2024 assessment correctly scored the PDN acuity tool, with remaining needs constituting routine parenting not countable under N.J.A.C. 10:60-5.4(f) or covered by PCA hours.. Official decision (PDF)

M.E. v Horizon NJ Health (January 2026) — Reversed. DMAHS adopted the ALJ's decision rejecting Horizon's reduction of PDN hours from 24 hours per day, 7 days per week to 20 hours per day, 7 days per week for a 14-year-old with tracheostomy and g-tube, because Horizon failed to show how it factored in the N.J.A.C. 10:60-5.4(c) situational criteria — notably that Petitioner's father is his sole trained caregiver and only other household member — and a score on Horizon's PDN Acuity Tool alone does not establish lack of medical necessity. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Holds the PDN Acuity Tool appears nowhere in state regulations and is neither mandated nor endorsed by DMAHS, and the MCO bears the burden to justify a PDN reduction under the regulatory medical-necessity and situational-criteria standards.

N.L. v DMAHS & Horizon (January 2026) — Affirmed. Horizon's reduction of private duty nursing from 19 to 16 hours per day in November 2024 was affirmed under N.J.A.C. 10:60-5.9(c), which caps PDN at 16 hours daily for MLTSS beneficiaries over 21 with a live-in caregiver providing 8 hours, with no emergency exception shown, no IV therapy, and adequate notice without the PDN acuity tool. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Holds OAL/DMAHS lack jurisdiction to decide ADA and Rehabilitation Act discrimination claims challenging the 16-hour PDN cap.

W.C. v Aetna (January 2026) — Reversed. The Initial Decision was reversed because Aetna improperly used the PCA Assessment Tool instead of the NJ Choice Assessment System required by its DMAHS contract and N.J.A.C. 10:164 to evaluate adult medical day care eligibility after reducing PCA hours from 25 to 9 hours per week (10 with an additional hour), so Aetna must reassess petitioner within four weeks with coverage continuing in the interim. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Holds an MCO used the wrong assessment instrument for adult medical day care, reversing the ALJ and ordering a NJ Choice reassessment.

C.C. v Horizon NJ Health (February 2026) — Affirmed. Denial of dental implants affirmed because petitioner met none of the conditions of N.J.A.C. 10:56-2.13(c)(1) — she has no facial anomaly or deformity and did not wear her complete dentures for the required two years — and her physicians' letters did not carry her burden of proof.. Official decision (PDF)

E.R. v United Healthcare (February 2026) — Affirmed. Termination of 14 PCA hours per week affirmed because, after heart-transplant rehabilitation, petitioner could walk, bathe, eat, groom, dress, and toilet without hands-on assistance and needed help only with IADLs, which cannot support PCA services alone under N.J.A.C. 10:60-3.1(c) and (c)(1).. Official decision (PDF)

F.M. v DMAHS & OCCO (February 2026) — Affirmed. Denial of clinical eligibility affirmed because OCCO's assessment showed petitioner independent in all ADLs with no memory issues, failing the Nursing Facility Level of Care criteria under N.J.A.C. 10:166 (formerly N.J.A.C. 8:85-2.1), which require deficits in at least three ADLs and/or severe cognitive impairment compromising safety.. Official decision (PDF)

F.M. v United Healthcare (February 2026) — Affirmed. Reduction from 40 to 19 PCA hours per week affirmed because the April 7, 2025 state-mandated PCA Tool assessment, reviewed ADL by ADL for the 19-year-old petitioner with severe autism, properly calculated 19 hours under N.J.A.C. 10:60-3.1(c), and the prior 40 hours were only a temporary administrative maximum pending assessment.. Official decision (PDF)

G.D. v Horizon NJ Health (February 2026) — Reversed. Reduction of Private Duty Nursing from 16 to 12 hours per day for January 6–February 1, 2025 reversed and 16 hours per day, seven days per week restored, because Horizon failed its burden to show any change in petitioner's condition and relied solely on an unexplained Acuity Tool score drop from 39.5 to 33, ignoring the living-alone situational criteria of N.J.A.C. 10:60-5.4(c), with reassessment ordered within four weeks. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Rejects sole reliance on the Acuity Tool, enforces the MCO's burden on reductions, and notes the July 2025 DMAHS-MCO contract rule that an adverse reassessment within five years of an overturned reduction must explain the change since the overturn.

M.H. v OCCO & DMAHS (February 2026) — Affirmed. Denial of MLTSS clinical eligibility affirmed because petitioner independently performs all ADLs and has no cognitive impairment, failing the nursing facility level of care criteria of N.J.A.C. 10:166.. Official decision (PDF)

Y.F. v Wellpoint (February 2026) — Reversed. Reduction of an infant's private duty nursing reversed and eight hours per day, seven days per week restored because Wellpoint failed to prove any change in clinical condition — its only stated reason was better weight gain — and its PDN Acuity Scale appears nowhere in the regulations and is not DMAHS-endorsed under N.J.A.C. 10:60-5.4; reassessment ordered within four weeks. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Agency head reversed the ALJ, rejected reliance on an MCO acuity tool found nowhere in the regulations, and required evidence of a change in condition to cut PDN hours.

D.P. v Horizon NJ Health (March 2026) — Affirmed. Horizon's denial of an increase from 24 to 40 weekly Personal Care Assistance hours was upheld because the petitioner offered only a conclusory one-paragraph physician letter with no specifics showing the 24 hours were insufficient, while Horizon's nurse gave credible, undisputed testimony applying the State PCA assessment tool under N.J.A.C. 10:60-3.1(c).. Official decision (PDF)

F.C. v DMAHS & OCCO (March 2026) — Affirmed. The denial of MLTSS clinical eligibility was upheld because the NJ Choice Assessment showed the petitioner was cognitively intact and independent in six of seven ADLs, so she met none of the nursing-facility level-of-care criteria in N.J.A.C. 10:166-2.1 and the NJ FamilyCare Comprehensive Demonstration.. Official decision (PDF)

H.S. v DMAHS & Aetna (March 2026) — Reversed. Aetna's denial of dental implants was reversed because the petitioner's mandibular tori are deformities that prevent effective use of a denture, satisfying the medical-necessity standard of N.J.A.C. 10:56-2.13(c)(1), and the treating dentist who examined the petitioner in person was credited over Aetna's records-and-photographs reviewer.. Official decision (PDF)

J.H. v DMAHS & United Healthcare (March 2026) — Affirmed. UnitedHealthcare's denial of scopolamine patches beyond the plan's limit of ten per thirty days was upheld because the request for a patch every other day fell outside the standard dosing guidelines and no testimony or records established medical necessity for the higher dosage under N.J.A.C. 10:51-1.11.. Official decision (PDF)

J.M. v Horizon NJ Health (March 2026) — Affirmed. Horizon's termination of Personal Care Assistance services (and, by extension, Personal Preference Program services) was upheld because the petitioner admitted he performs all ADLs independently and his mother's help was supervision and IADL tasks, which cannot stand alone as a PCA service under N.J.A.C. 10:60-3.1(c).. Official decision (PDF)

L.N. v DMAHS & Wellpoint (April 2026) — Affirmed. Wellpoint's denial of an enclosed specialty safety bed for a three-year-old with Williams syndrome was upheld because, under N.J.A.C. 10:59-1.4(a) and the Clinical UM Guideline for Hospital Beds and Accessories, such a bed is medically necessary only when the individual must be restrained in bed and less restrictive alternatives have been tried and failed, neither of which was shown.. Official decision (PDF)

M.A. v DMAHS & Horizon (April 2026) — Affirmed. Horizon's reduction of private duty nursing from fourteen to eight hours per day was upheld under N.J.A.C. 10:60-5.4(b) because successive acuity-tool scores fell (28 to 24.5 to 21.5) with reduced CPAP/BPAP need, and tasks such as suctioning and chest physiotherapy can be performed by trained caregivers, including the parents.. Official decision (PDF)

M.D. v DMAHS & OCCO (April 2026) — Affirmed. OCCO's denial of clinical eligibility for nursing-facility level of care was upheld under N.J.A.C. 10:166-2.1 because petitioner performed all ADLs independently and had intact, safe decision-making (BIMS score 14 of 15), meeting none of the three MLTSS clinical criteria, and an independent assessment under N.J.A.C. 1:10B-14.2 is unavailable for MLTSS clinical eligibility assessments.. Official decision (PDF)

M.D. v Horizon NJ Health (April 2026) — Affirmed. Horizon's award of thirty Personal Care Assistant hours per week (rather than the fifty-six requested) was affirmed under N.J.A.C. 10:60-3.1(c) because the PCA assessment allotted the maximum time for incontinence, bathing, and shopping and correctly applied the housekeeping formula of 120 minutes divided by the number of household members, and petitioner offered no expert testimony to the contrary.. Official decision (PDF)

A.D. v Horizon (May 2026) — Remanded. The agency head reversed the ALJ and remanded for further fact-finding on whether Horizon's termination of PPP/PCA services was proper, because although PDN services cannot overlap PCA services as duplicative, the record did not establish what steps Horizon BCBS, the primary payer, took to remedy its failure to staff the authorized 24-hour PDN services. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Agency head refused to accept the duplication rationale on an incomplete record where the primary insurer had failed to deliver the authorized PDN services.

J.W. v DMAHS & OCCO (May 2026) — Affirmed. OCCO's denial of Pediatric MLTSS clinical eligibility was upheld because the 15-year-old met none of the N.J.A.C. 10:166-2.1 / Section 1115 pediatric skilled-nursing criteria — no ventilator, tracheostomy, deep suctioning, gastrostomy feeding, or technology dependence, and no frequent prolonged seizures requiring emergency anticonvulsant medication in the prior four months (his last seizure was over a year earlier) — and his physician's letter did not tie his needs to any criterion.. Official decision (PDF)

K.J. v DMAHS & OCCO (May 2026) — Affirmed. The MLTSS clinical-eligibility denial was upheld because the assessment showed petitioner was independent in all ADLs and cognitively intact, needing only housekeeping and laundry, which are not qualifying ADLs under N.J.A.C. 10:166-2.1; her exceptions were also rejected for failing to specify the findings challenged, as N.J.A.C. 1:1-18.4(b) requires.. Official decision (PDF)

L.E. v DMAHS & Horizon NJ (May 2026) — Affirmed. Horizon's reduction of private duty nursing from 24 to 16 hours per day when petitioner turned twenty-one was upheld because N.J.A.C. 10:60-5.9(c) caps adult MLTSS PDN at sixteen hours daily with a live-in primary caregiver providing at least eight, no emergency exception applied, the notice (which needed no PDN acuity tool, since the reduction turned on age, not assessment) satisfied due process, and the OAL lacks jurisdiction to decide ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Squarely holds the OAL and DMAHS have no jurisdiction over ADA/Rehabilitation Act challenges to the sixteen-hour PDN cap, applying T.M. v. DMAHS.

L.M. v DMAHS & Aetna (May 2026) — Dismissed. The appeal of Aetna's partial denial of private duty nursing services for a ten-year-old was dismissed as moot, and the dismissal adopted, because Aetna rescinded the denial and granted the requested services with no lapse, leaving no live controversy on which the agency could grant relief.. Official decision (PDF)

B.T. v Horizon NJ Health (June 2026) — Reversed. DMAHS reversed the Initial Decision and restored private duty nursing at 16 hours per day, seven days a week, because an MCO reducing previously approved PDN hours bears the burden of showing how the member's clinical condition changed, and Horizon's only cited change — that the child could now use the bathroom independently — was insufficient, its Acuity Tool score being no substitute since the tool appears nowhere in state regulations. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Applies the MCO burden-of-proof rule for service reductions and the State/MCO contract § 4.6.4D(2) requirement that any future adverse determination describe the change since an overturned reduction.

G.G. v Horizon NJ Health (June 2026) — Affirmed. Horizon's denial of private duty nursing was upheld because the six-year-old's only intervention was gastrostomy feeding, and uncomplicated g-tube feedings that a trained caregiver can administer do not constitute medical necessity under N.J.A.C. 10:60-5.4(d)(3), there being no documented reflux or aspiration and overnight feeds having been discontinued. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Holds the 24-hour onsite assessment requirement of N.J.A.C. 10:60-5.5(f)(2) applies to reassessments, not to an initial assessment by a new MCO.

J.S. v Horizon NJ Health (June 2026) — Affirmed. Termination of 12 hours per day of private duty nursing was upheld because Horizon carried its burden of showing a changed clinical condition since the 2019 approval — the tracheostomy had been removed, petitioner was stable on room air, and he required no ventilator support, deep suctioning, or around-the-clock nebulizer treatments — so PDN was no longer medically necessary under N.J.A.C. 10:60-5.4(b) and (d), and the Goldberg v. Kelly due process challenge failed. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Applies the same MCO burden-of-proof framework as B.T. and finds it satisfied on documented clinical improvement.

R.H. v Horizon NJ Health corrected (June 2026) — Reversed. Horizon's reduction of Personal Care Assistance services from forty to twenty-one hours per week was overturned and the forty hours maintained, because under the standard of N.T. v. Horizon an MCO must present evidence specifically addressing a change in the beneficiary's condition to warrant the specified reduction, and its assessing nurse's testimony was only marginally credible and fell below the baseline necessary to justify the cut. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Applies the N.T. change-in-condition standard to PCA reductions and holds the agency head may not reject or modify an ALJ's findings or credibility determinations unless they are arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or unsupported by sufficient competent and credible evidence (N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10).

R.H. v Horizon NJ Health (June 2026) — Reversed. Original May 28, 2026 Final Agency Decision adopting the Initial Decision and finding Horizon's reduction of PCA hours from forty to twenty-one per week unsupported by the evidence, for the reasons stated in the corrected decision summarized above. Official decision (PDF) Superseded original: it differed from the corrected decision only in stating that neither party filed exceptions to the Initial Decision; Horizon had in fact filed exceptions on March 10, 2026, and the corrected decision of June 21, 2026 considered and rejected those exceptions and amended the decision solely to reflect their filing, expressly leaving the substance unchanged.

S.E. v DMAHS & Horizon NJ Health (June 2026) — Affirmed. Termination of private duty nursing services affirmed because the preponderance of the evidence showed petitioner's condition had improved between the May 2024 and December 2024 assessments — continence through a prompted toileting program, significantly increased oral intake, and reduced nebulizer treatments — so he no longer requires the ongoing, complex skilled nursing interventions required by N.J.A.C. 10:60-5.3(b), although Horizon must offer petitioner the opportunity to request a fair hearing on its December 2025 and February 2026 reassessments if it has not already.. Official decision (PDF)

B.N. v DMAHS & Fidelis Care (July 2026) — Remanded. DMAHS remanded the Initial Decision upholding Fidelis Care's denial of implant-supported dentures because the decision lacked findings on petitioner's denture-use history — the two-year prerequisite for implant prior authorization under N.J.A.C. 10:56-2.13(c)(1) — and on the weight given to the treating dental providers' opinions.. Official decision (PDF)

B.Z. v DMAHS & Fidelis Care (July 2026) — Settlement adopted. DMAHS adopted the Initial Decision approving the parties' settlement agreement under N.J.A.C. 1:1-19.1, resolving petitioner's appeal of Fidelis Care's reduction of private duty nursing from 24 hours per day, seven days per week, to 16 hours per day, seven days per week.. Official decision (PDF)

C.W. v Fidelis Care (July 2026) — Mixed. DMAHS reversed the Initial Decision upholding Fidelis Care's reduction of a ventilator-dependent four-year-old's private duty nursing from 24 to 16 hours per day and remanded, because the record — which did not even include Fidelis's Notice of Action letter — did not show whether the plan assessed the child's clinical condition or merely relied on the assessment score drop (67 to 54.4 points), and the Initial Decision's one-sentence analysis was insufficient. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: DMAHS articulates the DMAHS–MCO contract rule that a notice reducing ongoing services must describe, in plain language in the letter itself, how the member's condition changed; merely referencing an assessment is incomplete and non-compliant.

D.A. v DMAHS & Fidelis Care (July 2026) — Remanded. DMAHS remanded the Initial Decision upholding Fidelis Care's reduction of an eight-year-old's Personal Care Assistant services from 26 to 20 hours per week because, under Managed Care Contract Article 4.6.4.D (2025), a notice reducing ongoing services must explain in plain language the change between the member's previous and current condition, and neither the January 2026 assessment nor the record identified any change justifying the reduction. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Applies the MCO plain-language change-of-condition notice rule of Contract Art. 4.6.4.D, including to a receiving MCO after a plan transfer.

E.E. v Horizon New Jersey (July 2026) — Affirmed. DMAHS adopted the Initial Decision upholding Horizon NJ Health's denial of Personal Care Assistant services because petitioner, a 22-year-old with autism, OCD, ADD and anxiety, did not meet the N.J.A.C. 10:60-3.1(c) threshold of moderate-or-greater hands-on assistance in at least one ADL or minimal assistance in three ADLs, and the physicians' letters supporting services were dated and never identified which ADLs required hands-on help.. Official decision (PDF)

J.M.G. v United Healthcare (July 2026) — Affirmed. DMAHS adopted the Initial Decision upholding United Healthcare's denial of replacement implant abutments and a new fixed denture because those services were not a covered benefit and petitioner provided no clinical evidence that her previously approved and properly fitting implant-supported denture needed to be redone (N.J.A.C. 10:56-2.13(c)).. Official decision (PDF)

K.G. v OCCO & DMAHS (July 2026) — Affirmed. DMAHS adopted the Initial Decision upholding OCCO's denial of MLTSS clinical eligibility because the NJ Choice assessment showed petitioner was independent in nearly all activities of daily living (needing assistance only with bathing) and met none of the three nursing-facility level-of-care criteria under N.J.A.C. 10:166-2.1 and the NJ FamilyCare Comprehensive Demonstration, Section 1115.. Official decision (PDF)

M.D. v DMAHS & OCCO (July 2026) — Affirmed. Denial of nursing-facility level of care upheld (agency adopted the Initial Decision): the NJ Choice assessment showed petitioner independent in all ADLs with intact, safe decision-making (BIMS 14 of 15), so he did not meet the clinical criteria of N.J.A.C. 10:166-2.1 despite some short-term memory impairment.. Official decision (PDF)

S.D. v Horizon New Jersey (July 2026) — Remanded. Agency head reversed the Initial Decision and remanded Horizon's dental-crown denial (endodontic therapy, tooth #5): the ALJ wrongly treated the decision as deemed adopted — the October 2, 2023 waiver covers only over-income, over-resource, and failure-to-provide cases — cited the orthodontics rule N.J.A.C. 10:56-3.11 instead of N.J.A.C. 10:56-2.11 and -2.10, applied the inapplicable "arbitrary and capricious" standard, and omitted witness testimony and exhibits from the record. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Agency head defines the limits of the deemed-adoption waiver and the correct legal framework for MCO dental-service fair hearings.

T.J. v Horizon New Jersey (July 2026) — Affirmed. Horizon's reduction of private duty nursing from 16 to 12 hours per day affirmed (agency adopted the Initial Decision): the 16 hours were a temporary increase after a November 2024 hospitalization (Foley catheter, open wounds), those conditions resolved, and the June 2025 assessment scored 34, within the 8–12-hour range under N.J.A.C. 10:60-5.9(c)(1).. Official decision (PDF)

T.R. v DMAHS & OCCO (July 2026) — Affirmed. Denial of clinical eligibility affirmed (agency adopted the Initial Decision): although petitioner's left leg was amputated above the knee, the NJ Choice assessment found him independent in all ADLs and cognitively intact (3-of-3 object recall), so he met none of the nursing-facility level-of-care criteria in N.J.A.C. 10:166-2.1.. Official decision (PDF)

Z.T. v Horizon New Jersey (July 2026) — Affirmed. Horizon's reduction of private duty nursing from 16 to 12 hours per day affirmed (agency adopted the Initial Decision after both parties' exceptions): documented improvements since March 2024 (no sleep disturbance, no chest physiotherapy or nebulizing, suctioning only as needed) produced an Acuity score of 28.5, in the 8–12-hour range under N.J.A.C. 10:60-5.4, with the top of the range awarded because petitioner's caregiver grandmother is eighty-two.. Official decision (PDF)

C.M. v Wellpoint (August 2026) — Affirmed. Wellpoint's denial of PCA/Personal Preference Program services was upheld because petitioner, though cognitively impaired, needed only cueing and supervision rather than the moderate-or-greater hands-on assistance with an ADL (or minimal assistance with three ADLs) required by N.J.A.C. 10:60-3.1(c), and the PCA Tool scored only 3.08 hours per week.. Official decision (PDF)

D.D.L. v Horizon NJ Health (August 2026) — Remanded. The agency head remanded to the OAL because the Initial Decision upholding 14 (rather than 40) weekly PCA hours for a severely autistic 17-year-old was internally inconsistent about which N.J.A.C. 10:60-3.1(c) eligibility prong he met and relied on testimony of a witness ("Ms. Torres") who never testified.. Official decision (PDF)

G.H. v DMAHS & OCCO (August 2026) — Affirmed. The denial of clinical eligibility was upheld because the NJ Choice assessment showed petitioner performed all ADLs independently and was cognitively intact, so she met none of the nursing-facility level-of-care criteria in N.J.A.C. 10:166-2.1 or the Section 1115 demonstration, and SSI status alone did not establish clinical eligibility.. Official decision (PDF)

M.A. v Horizon NJ Health (August 2026) — Remanded. The agency head reversed the Initial Decision upholding termination of eight hours per day of PDN and remanded, because Maximus had overturned Horizon's PDN denial in 2024 and MCO Contract § 4.6.4(D)(2) requires the plan to identify the change in condition or living arrangements justifying a termination within five years of an overturn, and because Horizon's PDN Acuity Tool (threshold score 19) appears nowhere in the regulations and cannot substitute for the medical-necessity standard of N.J.A.C. 10:60-5.3(b) and -5.4(b). Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Rejects an MCO's proprietary acuity tool as a substitute for the regulatory PDN standard and enforces the contract's post-overturn change-in-condition requirement.

J.T. v DMAHS & OCCO (September 2026) — Affirmed. Denial of clinical eligibility was upheld: the NJ Choice assessment showed petitioner independent in all ADLs and cognitively intact, his contrary toileting testimony was found not credible, and his exceptions were also filed out of time.. Official decision (PDF)

K.M. v DMAHS & OCCO (September 2026) — Affirmed. Termination of nursing-facility level-of-care clinical eligibility was upheld: OCCO's independent assessment found petitioner independent in all ADLs with intact cognition (MDS cognitive score 15 of 15), and medical diagnoses alone do not establish NFLOC under N.J.A.C. 10:166-2.1.. Official decision (PDF)

M.T. v DMAHS & UnitedHealthcare (September 2026) — Remanded. UnitedHealthcare's cut of a 12-year-old's private duty nursing from 84 to 56 hours per week was remanded because neither the plan nor the ALJ explained what changed in her condition to justify the reduction after ten years at 84 hours — the NJ Managed Care Contract, Article 4.6.4.D, requires the notice itself to detail the change, and the last rescue-medication use in February 2022 had never before triggered a reduction. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Enforces the MCO contract's change-in-condition explanation requirement for service reductions.

Transfer Penalties and Asset Transfers (17)

E.B. v DMAHS & Ocean County (January 2026) — Affirmed. DMAHS adopted the ALJ and upheld a revised 718-day transfer penalty on $316,016.98 in look-back transfers for less than fair market value under N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.10(c) (reduced from 745 days / $328,179.88 after $12,162.90 in verified transfers was deducted), finding Petitioner failed to rebut the presumption under N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.10(j) and (i)2 that the transfers — including $218,848.72 in charitable donations — were made exclusively for a purpose other than establishing Medicaid eligibility. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Reasons through the transfer-penalty presumption, holding that even if charities benefited, the penalty stands where Medicaid eligibility was a factor and reliance on counsel's advice does not rebut it.

M.S. v DMAHS & Hudson County (January 2026) — Reversed. DMAHS adopted the ALJ and vacated Hudson County's $212,417.70 transfer penalty (471 days, September 1, 2024 to December 26, 2025) under N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.10, finding credible evidence that petitioner's brother W.S. misused a POA to transfer petitioner's home-sale and Social Security funds for his own benefit without consent while petitioner had dementia and lacked capacity to authorize or control the transfers. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Holds dementia alone is insufficient, but documented financial exploitation/POA misuse rebuts the eligibility-purpose presumption and bars a penalty, expressly limited to its unusual facts.

B.S. v DMAHS & Hunterdon County (February 2026; listed by DMAHS as "E.S. v DMAHS & Hunterdon County"; the decision is captioned B.S.) — Affirmed. 257-day penalty on $103,827 affirmed for the August 20, 2021 transfer of petitioner's home to her son for $338,443 when it was appraised at $550,000 ($211,655.57 below fair market value), because petitioner failed to rebut the N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.10(j) presumption — the claimed roughly $200,000 back-wages debt was unsupported by evidence and the competing $490,000 appraisal lacked supporting testimony. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Reasons through transfer-penalty valuation and the community-spouse/resource adjustment, and applies the failure-to-rebut standard for the Medicaid-purpose presumption.

C.F. v Gloucester County & DMAHS (March 2026) — Affirmed. The 583-day penalty on $256,863.16 was upheld: the community spouse's transfer of the home's remainder interest to an irrevocable trust for $1 did not qualify for the sole-benefit-of-spouse exemption because the trust named the daughter, not the State, as first remaining beneficiary as N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.10(f) requires, and the remainder was valued using the $440.10 penalty divisor from Medicaid Communication 24-03. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Detailed application of the sole-benefit trust test and of 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c)(4)–(5) to a community spouse's transfer made after the institutionalized spouse was already on Medicaid.

R.J. v DMAHS & Middlesex County (March 2026) — Mixed. The 101-day penalty on $40,700 in transfers was upheld, but a broken watch from the petitioner's deceased mother and a school ring from her deceased spouse, valued together at $1,200, were held to be excludable personal effects under N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.4(b)(3), making the petitioner resource-eligible as of August 1, 2024 and ending the penalty on November 9, 2024.. Official decision (PDF)

E.L. v DMAHS & Atlantic County (May 2026) — Affirmed. The 327-day transfer penalty was upheld as recalculated to exclude only the $7,969.70 used to buy a Medicaid-compliant annuity, because petitioner failed to rebut the N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.10 presumption as to the $80,538.30 transfer to her daughter, the $850 in claimed customary holiday gifts (no documented gift pattern), and the $42,584 in claimed caregiver payments to F.B., which rested on inconsistent testimony with no agreements or records of hours worked. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Detailed application of the -4.10 rebuttal burden rejecting undocumented family caregiver payments and an unsubstantiated "customary gifts" claim.

R.M. v DMAHS & Gloucester County (May 2026) — Affirmed. The 244-day transfer penalty on $98,664.54 was upheld because petitioner failed to rebut the N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.10(j) presumption: the $30,000 check and $68,664.42 in AT&T stock transferred to his brother were said to repay a 2010 oral promise to compensate the brother for a share of family property and to fund property repairs, but there was no written agreement and no receipts or invoices for the work. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Unwritten intra-family repayment claims, without documentation, do not rebut the transfer presumption.

E.C. v Monmouth & DMAHS (June 2026) — Remanded. DMAHS agreed a transfer penalty was proper as to funds claimed to reimburse a live-in aide, there being no pre-existing documentary evidence of a compensation arrangement as N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.10(b)6ii requires, but reversed and remanded the 95-day penalty on $41,973 because neither the county nor the ALJ justified rejecting the POA's store receipts, the place of purchase alone being an insufficient basis to discredit them. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Reasons through the transfer-penalty rebuttal rules and holds receipts cannot be disregarded merely because purchases were made away from petitioner's residence.

L.R. v DMAHS & Hudson County (June 2026) — Remanded. DMAHS agreed the ninety-eight-year-old petitioner failed to rebut the presumption that $372,133.98 transferred during the look-back period was transferred to establish eligibility (924-day penalty), but remanded the ALJ's undue hardship waiver because the Initial Decision did not sufficiently show the assets were irrefutably beyond her control with all legal and equitable remedies exhausted, as N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.10(q)(1)(ii) requires. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Applies the stringent two-prong undue hardship standard of N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.10(q), requiring a detailed accounting of the transferred funds and of the legal or other steps taken to recover them before a transfer penalty can be waived.

E.M. v Middlesex County (July 2026) — Affirmed. Denial for excess resources was affirmed because petitioner's countable resources of $8,602.23 exceeded the $2,000 limit (N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.5), and the ALJ rejected her argument that her son's $6,700 cash withdrawal should have been treated as a gift subject to a transfer penalty instead of a denial, since petitioner admittedly never verified where the withdrawn cash was deposited. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Holds the county could not assess a transfer penalty where the applicant failed to verify the disposition of the withdrawn funds.

M.H. v Union County (July 2026) — Affirmed. 141-day transfer penalty on $56,987.94 affirmed (agency adopted the Initial Decision): the proceeds of petitioner's condo sale went to her son's business account, and the claimed offset — a verbal agreement that he would carry the property's expenses ($44,609.50 paid 2021–2024) — was undocumented, so the presumption that the transfer was to qualify for Medicaid was not rebutted under N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.10(j) and no undue hardship was shown. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Reasons through the N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.10(j)/(i) rebuttal standard — family expense payments under an unwritten agreement do not offset a penalty when Medicaid eligibility was a factor in the transfer.

M.B. v Union County (August 2026) — Reversed. The 120-day ineligibility penalty imposed on the second application was reversed as arbitrary and capricious because petitioner substantially complied with the verification requests — even Wells Fargo could confirm only that a $40,000 cash deposit existed, not its source — and everything else sought under N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.1 et seq. was provided. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Vacates a 120-day penalty where the bank itself could not document the source of a $40,000 cash deposit.

P.C. v DMAHS & Middlesex County (August 2026) — Reversed. The 91-day transfer penalty on petitioner's home sale was vacated: the home sold on the open market for $150,000 (the highest of five offers) and a retroactive certified appraisal valued it at $150,000 as of the September 16, 2022 closing, so it was not sold for less than fair market value despite the county's equalized-valuation figure of $190,180.31, and because all proceeds paid for her nursing home care she rebutted the N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.10(j) presumption that the sale was made to qualify for Medicaid. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Transfer-penalty ruling rejecting the county's equalized-valuation FMV in favor of actual market evidence and a retroactive appraisal.

D.O. v DMAHS & Union County (September 2026) — Affirmed. A 531-day transfer penalty on $214,250 was upheld because petitioner produced no caregiving agreement, logs, invoices, or other pre-existing documentation that the transfers to his daughter paid for care, so the presumption that the transfers were made to establish eligibility was not rebutted. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Applies the caregiver-compensation presumption of N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.10(b)(6)(ii) — undocumented family care payments treated as penalizable transfers.

E.C. v Monmouth County & DMAHS (September 2026) — Affirmed. On remand, the 95-day penalty on $41,973 was upheld after the ALJ supplemented the record with specific findings — the grandson/POA's store receipts were partly illegible or deficient and did not prove the purchases were solely for petitioner — following the agency head's June 2026 remand directing that purchase location alone cannot discredit receipts. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Agency head required specific findings before expenditure receipts could be rejected.

G.H. v Mercer County & DMAHS (September 2026) — Remanded. The transfer-penalty case was remanded to OAL solely to settle the record, because bank statements (exhibit R-9) listed as admitted evidence were missing from the OAL case file; the penalty merits were not decided.. Official decision (PDF)

R.W. v DMAHS & Hudson County (September 2026) — Affirmed. A 144-day transfer penalty on $58,171.56 was upheld because petitioner's inherited share of her mother's Bayonne five-family house was not an unavailable resource merely because the estate remained in probate — it had been in probate 38 years and, like her sister, she could have petitioned the court for distribution but never acted. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Holds a decades-old undistributed probate inheritance is an available, penalizable asset where the heir never sought distribution.

Community Spouse and Spousal Issues (10)

M.G. v Bergen County (January 2026) — Affirmed. The denial of ABD Medicaid for excess resources was upheld because Petitioner, though estranged from his wife, remains legally married and lives at the same address, so he is a household of two whose countable resources of $1,901.88 exceed the $1,763 resource standard for a household of two under N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.5.. Official decision (PDF)

G.K. v DMAHS & Middlesex County (February 2026) — Affirmed. County's refusal to determine petitioner's eligibility as of April 30, 2024 affirmed because petitioner was listed only as the spouse on E.K.'s application and no spousal information form was submitted, so petitioner was never an applicant; N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.2(e)(1) requires the form to determine eligibility as a married couple. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Holds a person named only as 'spouse' on a spouse's application, without the N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.2(e)(1) spousal information form, is not an applicant and gets no filing-date protection.

A.D. v Mercer County (March 2026) — Affirmed. Denial upheld: the resource "snapshot" date is set by completion of the PAS process (December 20, 2024), so the couple's combined countable resources were measured on December 1, 2024 at $176,421.89, exceeding the $156,140 couple limit under N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.8(a), and the earlier November 2024 application was premature. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Reasons at length through the snapshot-date rule, holding "institutionalization" for the spousal resource assessment begins only when the PAS is completed, not on facility admission, citing prior FADs H.H., S.W., and G.B.

M.M. v Camden County (March 2026) — Reversed. The excess-resource denial was reversed because the community spouse's $41,250 single-premium annuity was not a countable resource: by signing the NJDOBI-approved immediate irrevocable election form, the spouse waived the ten-day free-look revocation right under N.J.S.A. 17B:25-39, so the annuity was irrevocable and its funds inaccessible on January 1, 2024. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Holds a community spouse can waive the statutory annuity free-look period to make a Medicaid-compliant annuity immediately irrevocable and non-countable, distinguishing the contrary FADs the county cited (J.C. v. DMAHS; G.S. v. DMAHS).

T.O. v Burlington County (April 2026) — Affirmed. Special Medicaid denial affirmed because petitioner, who lived with her husband with no legal separation or divorce, was a household of two whose combined countable income of $3,902 (her $1,817 salary plus his $2,086 RSDI) exceeded the $1,763 limit under N.J.A.C. 10:72-4.1.. Official decision (PDF)

B.K. v DMAHS & Middlesex County (June 2026) — Affirmed. Middlesex County correctly declined to determine B.K.'s eligibility under the September 4, 2024 application because she was listed only as E.K.'s spouse, not an applicant, and married-couple eligibility requires a spousal information form under N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.2(e)(1), which was not submitted until March 11, 2025; E.K.'s 79-day transfer penalty on a $35,000 transfer was also upheld.. Official decision (PDF)

K.T. v Middlesex County (July 2026) — Affirmed. Denial for excess resources was affirmed because the couple's countable resources of $243,790.99 exceeded the applicable resource standard of $159,920.00 under N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.5, measured as of June 1, 2025, the date petitioner became clinically eligible.. Official decision (PDF)

M.W. v Cumberland County (July 2026) — Affirmed. MLTSS denial affirmed: after petitioner married, the couple's combined resources were assessed under N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.8, and the community spouse's 457(b) deferred compensation plan ($48,588.98) counted as an available resource — it is not among the exclusions in N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.4 and the plan permits distributions to pay medical expenses — leaving countable resources of $19,184.38 even after the $31,584 community spouse resource allowance. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Applies Mistrick to hold a community spouse's 457(b) deferred compensation plan is an available countable resource even where both spouses live in the community, because the plan allows withdrawals for medical expenses.

P.H. v Morris County (July 2026) — Reversed. Denial of the first MLTSS application reversed: the same estrangement evidence and spousal exemption affidavit that won approval of the second application (spousal waiver) should have been accepted on the first, the representatives substantially complied, and the agency never offered more time or the assistance permitted by N.J.A.C. 10:71-2.2 and -2.3 — leaving a facility bill of over $100,000. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Reversal on duty-to-assist grounds — agency may not deny for incomplete paperwork it could have cured by extending time or assisting, then approve an identical estrangement showing on reapplication.

A.D. v DMAHS & Morris County (September 2026) — Reversed. DMAHS adopted the ALJ's increase of the community spouse's MMMNA from $1,222.75 to $1,722.75 per month, finding exceptional circumstances — the petitioner's ALS and ventilator-dependent institutionalization plus a documented monthly shortfall of about $889 — caused significant financial distress under N.J.A.C. 10:71-5.7(e). Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Grants a $500/month MMMNA increase on a reasoned exceptional-circumstances/financial-distress analysis.

Provider and Institutional Cases (5)

H.M.H. v DMAHS (June 2026) — Mixed. The hospital's claim denial was upheld as to the March 4, 2024 inpatient admission — an uncomplicated laparoscopic cholecystectomy that could have been managed on an outpatient basis was not medically necessary under N.J.A.C. 10:52-1.8(a)(1)(i) and the Milliman Care Guidelines — while payment for ancillary services rendered during the admission remained available under N.J.A.C. 10:52-1.6(b)(1). Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Provider/institutional payment dispute decided on a utilization-review audit of inpatient medical necessity.

M.O. v DMAHS & MFD (June 2026) — Dismissed. A Medicaid provider's appeal of the Medicaid Fraud Division's disqualification and termination of provider status (effective August 31, 2023) was dismissed under N.J.A.C. 1:1-14.4(a) because the provider repeatedly failed to appear at scheduled conferences and offered no good-cause explanation, even after corrected notices and an adjournment to obtain counsel; the Initial Decision was adopted. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Provider disqualification left standing through dismissal of the appeal for repeated non-appearance rather than any merits determination.

D.A. v DMAHS & MFD (July 2026) — Affirmed. DMAHS adopted the ALJ's summary decision upholding the Medicaid Fraud Division's disqualification of a licensed practical nurse from Medicaid participation, finding good cause for exclusion under N.J.A.C. 10:49-11.1(d) because her nursing license was suspended by the Board of Nursing for violating a Private Letter Agreement (positive lorazepam and alcohol screen and noncompliance with the RAMP monitoring program). Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Provider-side exclusion upheld on summary decision, resting on another agency's license suspension under N.J.A.C. 10:49-11.1(d)(24).

Pennscare Family Pharmacy v DMAHS & MFD (August 2026) — Settlement adopted. Following a Medicaid Fraud Division investigation of the pharmacy's billing practices, DMAHS sought recovery of $107,413.60 in overpayments; the agency head adopted the Initial Decision approving the parties' Settlement Agreement under N.J.A.C. 1:1-19.1. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Provider case — MFD overpayment claim of $107,413.60 resolved by approved settlement.

Barclays Rehab v MFD / Barnegat Nursing & Rehab v MFD / Bellevue Garden Group LLC v MFD (September 2026) — Reversed. In one consolidated PDF covering all three facilities, DMAHS reversed the ALJ's dismissal and held the Medicaid Fraud Division may enforce the NJ nursing-facility Staffing Law and recover claimed overpayments (Barnegat $791,380; Barclays $735,180; Bellevue $647,304) because staffing violations bear directly on Medicaid-funded care; summary decision was awarded to MFD and the case remanded to OAL only to adjudicate civil penalties. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Announces that MFD's program-integrity authority reaches Staffing Law violations, reversing the ALJ on a novel legal question.

Trusts (1)

T.L. v Middlesex County (January 2026) — Affirmed. Denial affirmed because neither the mother's 2003 E.M.L. Revocable Trust nor the T.L. sub-trust satisfies the special needs trust criteria in N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.11(g) — no separate trust document, not identified as an OBRA '93 trust, stated only as primarily rather than solely for T.L.'s benefit, and lacking supplement-not-supplant, State payback, and other required language — so the Ameriprise and PNC accounts, each exceeding the eligibility limit, were correctly counted as available resources under N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.11(e)(2). Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Item-by-item application of N.J.A.C. 10:71-4.11(g)(1) to a third-party testamentary sub-trust, with recommendation to create a new compliant trust before age 65.

Other Issues (2)

A.F. v DMAHS & Union County (June 2026) — Reversed. Union County's denial was incorrect because the five-year waiting period for qualified aliens under 8 U.S.C. § 1613 runs from when the applicant first became a qualified alien — for a VAWA self-petitioner, the August 30, 2017 self-petition — and does not restart on adjustment to lawful permanent resident status in July 2024, so petitioner was not limited to Medical Emergency Payment Program coverage. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Announces that a VAWA self-petitioner's five-year bar starts at qualified-alien status, not at later LPR adjustment.

M.P. v Monmouth County & DMAHS (June 2026) — Reversed. Petitioner, an undocumented patient hospitalized for 262 days, was found eligible for Medical Emergency Payment Program coverage for January through March 2025 because N.J.A.C. 10:49-2.19 requires an application, not a new application every three months, and the hospital and the designated authorized representative complied in good faith through monthly PA-1C forms and resubmissions. Official decision (PDF) Why it matters: Clarifies both MEPP practice and fair-hearing finality — the deemed-adopted treatment under 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(e)(14)(A) is limited to failure-to-provide-information, excess-resource, and excess-income cases, and all other cases follow standard agency-head review under N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.

A Note on Sources

All 214 decisions are linked to the official PDFs on DMAHS's Final Agency Decisions page. Eight of the links on that page were broken when this index was prepared — five of them pointed to files that do not exist under the names given — and the working links are used here. Three decisions are listed on the state page under names that differ from their own captions; this index follows the captions. DMAHS also posts both the original and a corrected version of one decision (R.H. v. Horizon NJ Health); the corrected version is the operative one, and both appear in the MLTSS section above so the record is complete. This page covers the decisions DMAHS had posted for January through September 2026 as of October 29, 2026.

[[PAGE BREAK]]